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ABSTRACT
This research paper is an analysis of a grassroots, agricultural project carried out from
2010 to 2011 in Gitarama Cell, a rural community in Rwanda, East Africa, during my United
States Peace Corps Volunteer service (2009-2011). The project began as the Twizere Agriculture
Club at Gitarama Primary School. The goal of the club was to increase food security among
community members through rabbit and chicken husbandry, and the study of such agriculture
techniques as composting, double digging, and the establishment of microgardens.
Despite the acknowledged need for this club, the Twizere Agriculture Club project met
multiple constraints that affected its outcomes. Discussing them with community members, club
participants, and local leaders, and analyzing the constraints provided valuable insight on the
psychological and social effects of trauma emanating from domestic conflict and genocide.
The primary findings of the analysis manifest the totalitarian, hard-version Theory X
leadership style the current ruling party uses to control the public, as well as corruption and
Stockholm syndrome conceivably among the local leader project stakeholders. Evidence
revealed appeasement and post-traumatic stress likely within many of the project stakeholders, in
addition to divided relationships, showing fear, anger, and mistrust among the project
beneficiaries—being probable effects of the 1994 Genocide. The data also illustrated possible
dependency syndrome in the project stakeholders.
The analysis led way to the formation of a hypothesis called The Post-Conflict/Genocide
Development Hypothesis. This hypothesis and the analysis’ primary findings may be useful to
development workers implementing projects at the grassroots level in post-conflict/genocide
societies by preventing some or all of the same constraints that transpired in the Twizere
Agriculture Club Project.
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PREFACE
The Republic of Rwanda, “the land of a thousand hills”, is a tiny, land-locked country
(Government of Rwanda, 2012) located in East Africa that is nestled among four countries:
Uganda to the north, Burundi to the south, Tanzania to the east, and the Democratic Republic of
Congo to the west (the Great Lakes region).1 The land area of Rwanda is 26,338 square
kilometers (16,366 square miles)—about the same size as the state of Maryland in the United
States (U.S.)—and lies on a volcanic mountain chain (Government of Rwanda, 2012). The
country is primarily known for its famous mountain gorillas, the equatorial forest pygmies, and
unfortunately, one of the most horrific massacres of history, the 1994 Rwandan Genocide.
The population of Rwanda is estimated to presently be almost 12 million people
(Government of Rwanda, 2012) with a ratio of 395 people per square kilometer (and
approximately 760 people per square kilometer of arable land), making it the most densely
populated country in Africa (International Youth Foundation, 2011)2. Three tribes of Bantu
origin make up the Rwandan people: The Bahutu (Hutu), the Batutsi (Tutsi), and the Batwa
(Twa).3 People of the Twa have more unique physical features and customs than of the Hutu and
Tutsi,4 but overall they share similar cultural characteristics. For example, all three tribes speak
the same Bantu language, Kinyarwanda, have the same diet, and historically prayed to the same
god, imana (Des Forges, 1999). Additionally, Des Forges (1999) states that historically,
polygamy and intermarriage between people of the Hutu and Tutsi were common before, but

1

See Appendix A, Figures 1-3 (pp. 92 & 93).

2

Rwanda has an estimated 3% annual growth rate. The population of almost 12 million people has increased from 8 million in 2000. It is typical
in rural Rwanda that the majority of people rent or own a very small plot (less than one hectare), and often cannot grow enough to feed
themselves (Government of Rwanda, 2000).

3

According to the U.S. State Department Bureau of African Affairs (2011), the Hutu people made up the majority of the population (90%),
while 9% were Tutsi, and the remaining 1% consisted of the Twa before the genocide.

4

The Twa in Rwanda are the indigenous forest pygmies who historically dwelt in neighboring Democratic Republic of Congo. The Twa are a
marginalized group and most live in extreme poverty.
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atypical after conflicts between these two tribes. Likewise, people of the Twa intermarried
occasionally with people of the Hutu and Tutsi tribes, but this practice was, and still is, shunned
by the general public.
Rwanda’s conflicted history between the Hutu and Tutsi tribes is long and complex.
Rwanda was one of the last countries in Africa to be colonized by Europe and it gained
independence following a revolt in 1959 (U.S. State Department Bureau of African Affairs,
2011). Several substantial events layered upon each other—including a civil war—and ultimately
led to the boiling point of the 1994 Genocide.5 The underlying causes behind these conflicts
concerned problems with the sharing of power between authorities, misconceptions of each
other, and fear (passed down from one generation to the next).
There is no doubt that the terrible event of the genocide left a devastating impact on
Rwandans everywhere. Sixteen years later, institutions, infrastructure, and the economy have
been rebuilt and restored, but the nation’s individuals have not. They are still in the slow and
painful process of trying to heal from the past. The Government of Rwanda (GOR), along with
many other actors, including international governments, global and local non-governmental
organizations (NGOs), and universities worldwide have invested in the post-conflict
reconstruction and development of Rwanda since 1994.
In the immediate aftermath of the genocide, post-conflict development focused on
meeting the basic needs of refugees (healthcare, water and sanitation facilities, food, shelter, and
protection), and the rebuilding of the destroyed infrastructure in the country (Government of
Rwanda, 2000). The majority of development programs today revolve around expanding and
improving the core areas for sustainable development in Rwanda—its economy6 and
5

See Appendix B, Significant Events in Rwandan History, Figure 5, for a more detailed account (p. 94).

6

According to the GOR (2000), 90% of the labor force in Rwanda is subsistent agriculture.
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infrastructure. The education, health, and information technology sectors, as well as an increased
focus on gender equality policies are also recipients of development programs (Government of
Rwanda, 2000). Development programs are administered under major frameworks such as, the
GOR’s Vision 2020 Development Plan,7 the United Nations’ Millennium Development Goals
(MDGs), and the U.S. President’s Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief (PEPFAR) initiative.8, 9
The U.S. Peace Corps is one of the many development partners that are working with the
GOR and other organizations to achieve Vision 2020 and the MDGs.10 Peace Corps returned to
Rwanda in July of 2008 under funding from PEPFAR and as a partner of U.S. Agency for
International Development (USAID) after a 15-year absence following the genocide. In January
2009, the first group of 34 Peace Corps Volunteers (of which I was a part) arrived in Rwanda to
begin work in the health sector.11

7

Vision 2020 is a comprehensive plan written by GOR in 2000 that strategically maps Rwanda’s post-genocide road to development in all
public and private sectors. For more information about Vision 2020, go to the GOR’s Ministry of Economics and Finance’s (MINECOFIN)
website at http://www.minecofin.gov.rw/ministry/key/vision2020.

8

See www.pepfar.gov/frameworks/index.htm for the President’s Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief's (PEPFAR) framework for development in
Rwanda.

9

President Paul Kagame states in the introduction of the GOR’s (2000) Vision 2020 Development Plan, “Today, Rwanda finds itself at a
crossroads, moving from the humanitarian assistance phase associated with the 1994 genocide into one of sustainable development” (p. 4).

10

The GOR is striving to establish and promote Vision 2020 and the MDGs following the genocide in the effort to develop the local public. (See
Rwanda’s National Institute of Statistics at www.statistics.gov.rw for more information on the MDGs in Rwanda). The GOR requires any
guests doing development work in the country to collaborate on projects that support the GOR’s development goals to reduce project
duplication. See the GOR’s website at www.gov.rw for more information about this policy.

11

The role of Health PCVs in Rwanda is to collaborate with community members and NGOs to assist the Rwanda’s Ministry of Health
(MINISANTE) in designing and conducting activities that focus on community development in the areas of healthcare, health education, and
capacity building. For more information about Peace Corps/Rwanda, visit www.peacecorps.gov.
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INTRODUCTION
1.1. Background of the Project Area
The administrative divisions of Rwanda are similar to those of the U.S. The five
provinces—North Province, South Province, East Province, West Province, and Kigali City
Province—are the equivalent of U.S. states. Each province is partitioned into districts, equivalent
to U.S. counties, and each district is made up of sectors, similar to townships in U.S. counties.
The sectors consist of cells, which are the same as U.S. towns (or cities). Small villages, making
up a cell are comparable to neighborhoods in the U.S. Gitarama Cell is located in West Province,
in the district of Karongi, in Bwishyura Sector (BS).12 This rural area of BS is approximately 16
kilometers (10 miles) from Karongi District’s (KD) main town, Karongi (formerly known as
Kibuye).13 Lake Kivu separates Kibuye from the Democratic Republic of Congo.
Gitarama Cell14 has nine institutions, consisting of two primary schools, one local
administrative office, and six churches.15 Infrastructure includes one main narrow dirt road that
leads from Kibuye to the Gitarama administrative office, and several dirt walking paths
(including one that goes from Gitarama to the main Kibuye-Kigali road). The only transportation
to Gitarama Primary School (GPS) at present is by foot or motorcycle.16 Gitarama has no general
stores, electricity, paved roads, or market. Clean water, however, is abundant because of the
natural, free-flowing spring water that runs through the hills from a source down to a river that

12

See Appendix A, Figure 4 (p. 93).

13

Before the genocide, the town of Karongi was called Kibuye. To prevent confusion, Karongi will be referred to as Kibuye for the duration of
this paper because the majority of the Rwandan population and the international community knew and still refer to the town as Kibuye.

14

For the duration of this paper, Gitarama Cell will be written Gitarama, as it is locally called.

15

At the time of this research, the GOR was in the process of measuring and remapping all the land throughout the country in efforts to complete
part of Vision 2020. After many attempts of inquiring about the exact size of Gitarama at its administrative office, the BS and KD
administrative offices, and the National Statistics Institute and Ministry of Local Governance (MINALOC) in Kigali, no specific information
was found.

16

The community is presently constructing a dirt road wide enough for a car to pass that leads from the main Kibuye-Kigali paved road as part of
cell-level umuganda. Imiganda is the plural of umuganda, which translating from Kinyarwanda means “community volunteer work days”. For
more information on umuganda, visit http://www.rgb.rw/main-menu/innovation/umuganda.html.

1

flows into Lake Kivu. This water is not privatized as it is in Kibuye, and the GOR recently
installed several hillside water pipes and reservoirs to control and maintain this water for public
use. The majority of the houses are small simple structures built of mud (some have old, cracked
cement on the walls) and have either tin or clay-tile roofs. Most are divided into a few small
rooms and up to 10 people may live in a household (as told by locals).
According to the 2002 census,17 about 677 families in eight different villages occupy
Gitarama; 1,448 are men, 1,605 are women, and the number of children is unknown (National
Institute of Statistics, 2003). Local authorities at the Gitarama administrative office approximate
that 99.9% of people living in Gitarama are subsistent farmers, while the other 0.1% teach at the
two local primary schools or hold other jobs as alternative sources of income. Some other
“wealthier” families have member(s) with steady employment in Kibuye, but the main source of
income outside agriculture for most of Gitarama’s families, is irregular hire as manual labor.
Kibuye locals remark that Gitarama is the poorest area in KD and academic performance
is the lowest in the region. The National Institute of Statistics (2005) reports that an estimated
85% of the local population in Gitarama lives in extreme poverty, and the other 15% lives in
moderate poverty. According to local authorities, few Gitarama children attend school because of
poverty, and a substantial number of these usually end up quitting in the early grades to tend to
household chores, younger siblings, or outside employment. Others leave to live elsewhere with
relatives. An estimated 20% of children have severe malnutrition and 60% are estimated to have
moderate malnutrition.

17

The Population and Housing Census in Rwanda takes place every ten years. The 2012 census is in process. See Rwanda’s National Institute of
Statistics at www.statistics.gov.rw for more information.

2

1.2. The Twizere Agriculture Club Project
During my two-and-a-half year Peace Corps service in Rwanda, I discovered the
hardships of poor crop production and malnutrition with which most Rwandans cope on a daily
basis. While working with community members in Kibuye, I learned of a rural area in BS,
having an enormous need for assistance. With the help of fellow Rwandan community members,
I co-designed and co-implemented an agricultural project that focused on animal husbandry of
rabbits and chickens, and bio-intensive agricultural techniques (alternative methods to traditional
farming in Rwanda) for the community in Gitarama. The pilot project began as an agriculture
club, called The Twizere (let’s have hope) Agriculture Club (TAC), for students at GPS and their
parents/guardians, and was a secondary project of my Peace Corps service.
Recognizing the widespread prevalence of food insecurity18 in Gitarama, I was interested
in addressing the problem through the Twizere Agriculture Club Project (TACP). Furthermore, I
was particularly curious to see how microgardens19 (bio-intensive home gardens), commonly
established in urban areas, might play a role in increasing food security in an overpopulated,
rural area, such as Gitarama. The project’s goal was to increase food security among an
impoverished, rural population, as one way of helping Rwandans meet the objectives of Vision
2020.20 Initial plans included trainings with club members on rabbit and chicken husbandry, biointensive cultivating techniques (including microgardens), and home implementation by club
members. Individual interviews and focus groups would examine the effects of club activities on
food security levels and the personal growth of club members.21
18

The soil in West Province, particularly in KD, is poor despite the sufficient rainfall and groundwater supply because of the depleted nutrients
and high acid content. This results in low quantity and quality of crop production.

19

See Appendix C, Microgardens (p. 96), for more information.

20

Under the six pillars, and the short and long-term objectives of Vision 2020: Promotion of macroeconomic stability and wealth creation to
reduce aid dependency (short-term) and create a productive middle class and fostering entrepreneurship (long-term). See Appendix C (p. 104).

21

See Appendix D, Twizere Agriculture Club Project Design (p. 101) for a complete description.

3

Many community members and I anticipated the TACP to spread throughout Gitarama
starting with students at GPS and their families and spreading beyond this community.
Unfortunately, the project ran into serious constraints before club activities could be executed,
beginning when efforts were made to conduct baseline surveys of TACP beneficiaries chosen by
GPS personnel (school leaders and teachers) using pre-determined identification criteria (IC).22

1.3. Statement of the Research Question
Article II of Resolution 260 (III) A of the United Nations General Assembly (United
Nations General Assembly, 1948) defines genocide as:
“…any of the following acts committed with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national,
ethnical, racial, or religious group, as such: (a) killing members of the group
(b) causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group (c) deliberately inflicting
on the group conditions of life calculated to bring about its physical destruction in whole or in
part (d) imposing measures intended to prevent births within the group (e) forcibly
transferring children of the group to another group” (p. 174).
Upon examination, the constraints of the TACP appeared to be associated with the
widespread trauma experienced in Rwanda during and after the 1994 Genocide. This initial
review made it clear that a systematic analysis, in light of the genocide trauma, would be
particularly useful in understanding why these constraints occurred. The conducted qualitative
research takes the form of a phenomenological case study based on the experience of the TAC
project with the single community of Gitarama. The purpose of this study is to lend insight into
the challenges other development workers may encounter undertaking projects in comparable
post-conflict/genocide contexts such as that of Rwanda. This paper assesses the case study’s
constraints and their likely association with the traumatic effects of the 1994 Rwandan Genocide.
It is my intent that the lessons learned will aid the successful implementation of future projects.

22

See Appendix D, Twizere Agriculture Club Project Design for the IC (p. 101).
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Some of the conceptual frameworks I used to analyze and comprehend the constraints
were theories on post-trauma psychopathology and sociology, behavioral characteristics of
individualist and collectivist cultures, styles of leadership and political systems, and corruption at
the local level and within leadership. Societal hierarchies and the effects of a post-conflict
culture—particularly trust, fear, and motivation—were other conceptual frameworks explored.
The particular culture emerging from the conflict and genocide, the inability to progress through
innovation and self-reliance due to the psychological development of helplessness and
dependency on outside assistance, are a few examples of what likely influenced the constraints
faced in this project. Rwanda’s economy, and the structure of the government and its existing
developmental initiatives, as well as hierarchical and leadership dynamics in Rwanda, are other
examples. The analysis of these theories will determine the extent of influence to which they are
consistent with the constraints faced in the TACP. Throughout this analysis, I will attempt to
answer the following primary question and sub-questions:
Primary Question:
In what ways can the lessons learned from a grassroots, community development project
assist future project designs for post-conflict/genocide societies?
Sub-questions:
(a) How did the dynamics of leadership in Rwanda relate to the constraints identified in the
Twizere Agriculture Club Project?
(b) How did the post-conflict culture of Gitarama affect the implementation of Twizere
Agriculture Club activities?

5

LITERATURE REVIEW
A traumatic experience can permanently damages one’s psyche and/or rip apart a
society’s social fabric, rendering it forever changed. Rwanda’s civil war and genocide, and the
resulting aftermath of these two conflicts are complex traumatic events that continue to affect
millions of lives including the nation’s current leaders. Uvin (2001) states:
…[genocide] and the enduring consequences of genocide…permeates, affects, and influences
human behavior so totally that it is remarkable that the survivors and the government have
been able to exercise the degree of restraint they have been exhibiting (p. 179).
This review will present the existing literature on trauma along with leadership, dependency
syndrome, and corruption in post-conflict societies.

2.1. Trauma
Aït Sidhoum, Arar, Bouatta, Khaled, & Elmasri (2002) define trauma as:
The conjunction of two types of facts: on one side, there are events that strike the individual
and the situation he finds himself in from the outside, temporarily or long-term. On the other
side, there are internal means by which the individual has to face these events and to cope
with these situations (p. 381).23
Overall, eight generic dimensions of trauma exist. One can observe them to be common
stressors worldwide, although the ways in which they are recognized vary among different
cultures (de Jong, 2002). De Jong (2002) states the eight dimensions of trauma as:
(a) threat to life and limb (b) severe physical harm or injury (c) receipt of intentional injury or
harm (d) exposure to the grotesque (e) violent/sudden loss of a loved one (f) witnessing or
learning of violence to a loved one (g) learning of exposure to a noxious agent (h) causing
death or severe harm to another (p. 35).
Traumatic events often create confusion in individuals—who perceive their lives as
threatened—and destroy their sense of control and trust in the world (Hamber & Wilson, 2002).
23

Aït Sidhoum et al. (2002) further explain that trauma occurs when these events threaten an individual’s homeostatic balance and he or she
must cope with them, but his or her coping mechanisms are not sufficient; or, he or she cannot restore this balance in the short-term without
professional help.
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There is no doubt that people who experience extremely horrific circumstances respond in
different ways depending on how they perceive the situation. One’s society, culture, and the
political system usually influence a victim’s reaction to the event (Summerfield, 1995). Victims
may develop trauma, which could result in chronic post-traumatic stress, and a range of other
psychopathological disorders.
An intense lack of control over one’s surroundings affects people of all ages—
particularly children—and leaves them vulnerable to developing post-traumatic stress disorder
(PTSD). PTSD is one of the most prominent psychopathological disorders a victim can develop
after experiencing a traumatic event, particularly when a victim encounters intense physical harm
(Mineka & Zinbarg, 2006). The definition of PTSD is not the same in all cultures,24 nor does
exposure to trauma always mean automatic development of PTSD (de Jong, 2002). There is a
parallel between a negative event and PTSD: the more unpredictable and uncontrollable the
event with its associated stress, the more likely PTSD symptoms25 will manifest, and the more
probable pre-existing PTSD symptoms will intensify. (Mineka & Zinbarg, 2006). Moreover, reexperiencing symptoms are more apt to develop or be prolonged if the individual is confronted
by another related traumatic event. Active avoidance (learned helplessness)—giving a designated
response to avoid punishments—or passive avoidance—avoiding situations that may give
reminders of the traumatic event—may also be elicited (Mineka & Zinbarg, 2006).
According to Siegmund & Wotjak (2006), symptoms of PTSD usually last for at least
24

Cultures around the world have diverse definitions of illnesses. Studies of how local cultures perceive mental health should be studied before
applying Westernized clinical definitions and indicators to cases in non-Westernized countries (Favila, 2009).

25

Symptoms of PTSD fall under the three categories: re-experiencing, avoidance, and increased arousal, as stated by the DSM-IV (Diagnostic
and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders, fourth edition) (Mineka & Zinbarg, 1996 and Cantor & Price, 2007). According to Cantor & Price
(2007), Mineka & Zinbarg (1996), and Siegmund & Wotjak (2006), symptoms in the re-experiencing category include a heightened memory
and victims have vivid recollections of the trauma, including nightmares, flashbacks, and emotional distress when exposed to reminders of the
event. Symptoms in the avoidance category include avoiding situations or thoughts related to the traumatic event (physical and emotional
numbness) and gaps in memory recall (dissociative amnesia). The increased arousal category shows symptoms of disturbed functioning
(difficulty sleeping or concentrating), generalized anxiety (exaggerated startle, hypervigilance and a fear beyond the individual’s control), and
hyporesponding (emotional blunting, social withdrawal, irritability, anger, having an aggressive behavior, and/or always being in a defensive
state) (Cantor & Price, 2007; Mineka & Zinbarg, 1996; Siegmund & Wotjak, 2006).
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several weeks or may increase as time passes. In response to trauma-related cues, profound
conditioned fear and anxiety, including feelings of mental and physical numbness, as well as
mental intrusions about the traumatic event are magnified and are key features of PTSD (Mineka
& Zinbarg, 2006; Frewen & Lanius, 2006). Studies on PTSD show that age, sex, and ethnicity
differ in response to trauma. Two–thirds of victims with PTSD symptoms are women (Aït
Sidhoum et al., 2002; Cavin, 2006; Pham, Weinstein, & Longman, 2004). This statement was
found to be true in Rwanda among the post-genocide female population according to postgenocide PTSD studies (Pham et al., 2004). Favila (2009) references a study where 80% of
women surveyed displayed signs of trauma. These circumstances influence the development of
PTSD in females because they can be a bigger target for abuse26 (Aït Sidhoum et al., 2002; Pham
et al., 2004), and/or women and men may respond differently to trauma (Cavin, 2006). Women
also may have the responsibility of running a household alone because their husbands are
missing, dead, or in jail (Qouta & el-Sarraj, 2002).
Oftentimes after extreme cases of trauma, PTSD turns into complex post-traumatic stress
disorder (CPTSD) (Cantor & Price, 2007). A field trial of the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual
of Mental Disorders, fourth edition (DSM-IV) of PTSD elucidated CPTSD as a “Disorder of
Extreme Stress Not Otherwise Specified” (DESNOS)27 with more intricate, dispersed, and
persistent symptoms than ordinary PTSD (e.g. distinctive changes in personality) (Cantor &
Price, 2007). Luxenburg, Spinazzola, & van der Kolk (2001) give three noteworthy symptoms of
DESNOS as frequent forgetfulness or spacing out, an “everybody is out just for themselves”
attitude, and the belief that it is impossible to make positive changes in life (chronic learned
26

Many women of post-trauma households take the brunt of their husbands’ frustration, anger, and trauma symptoms, and may become the
victims of domestic abuse (Qouta & el-Sarraj, 2002).

27

Research suggests that DESNOS does not occur in relation to specific traumatic experiences; however, DESNOS can appear in someone with
a history of interpersonal victimization, multiple traumatic events, and/or an extended duration of traumatic exposure (Luxenberg, Spinazzola,
& van der Kolk, 2001).
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helplessness affecting the ability to generate options, make choices and changes, and act on one’s
own behalf).
When a victim is in a traumatic entrapment situation (TES) (entrapped and unable to
flee), and at the mercy of a perpetrator, the victim then can experience repeated trauma, and
therefore is more susceptible to developing CPTSD28 (Cantor & Price, 2007). Mental health
specialists have strong evidence that when a person is traumatically entrapped, appeasing
becomes the basis of CPTSD and may lead to Stockholm syndrome (SS)29 (Cantor & Price,
2007). Cantor & Price (2007) also claim that victims in a TES, particularly severe abusive
relationships, may subject themselves to dominant hierarchies, reverted escape, de-escalation,
and conditional reconciliation in order to physically and mentally survive the trauma.
SS is a result of PTSD or CPTSD. It is a condition in which victims of abuse (children or
adults)—especially ones who have been held hostage, or experience daily domestic abuse—
evolve positive feelings towards their perpetrators. These positive feelings not only allow the
victim to obey the perpetrator’s demands, but also may create a situation where the victim
idealizes and even defends the perpetrator after his or her release (Cantor & Price, 2007).
Perpetrators generate hostile environments to create a dominant hierarchy with which they can
manipulate and control the victim. Threats may produce a sense of unpredictability that leads to
heightened stress in the individual, thus more or less guaranteeing total compliance and positive
attachment to the oppressor. To terminate verbal death threats or other physical and/or verbal
threats of torture, the victim submits himself or herself (Cantor & Price, 2007).
Cantor & Price (2007) identify four conditions that form the base of SS evolution:
28

CPTSD is especially common in victims of torture in TESs. Military and civilian, concentration camps, wartime and post-war time prisons,
torture, kidnapping, abusive cults, and domestic abuse are examples of TES (Cantor & Price, 2007) as well as civil wars and genocides where
physical and psychological torturing is likely to occur.

29

In TES, the relationship of power between perpetrators and victims is extremely imbalanced. Biologists and researchers have found that the
natural defense mechanism for mammals in surviving a TES is to appease the offender or attacker (Cantor & Price, 2007).
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(a) perceived threat to one’s physical or psychological survival by being at the mercy of a
perpetrator (b) perceived small acts of kindness towards the victim from the perpetrator
(c) isolation from any opinions or thoughts other than those of the perpetrator (d) an inability to
escape the situation. Brainwashing is another cause of SS (Cantor & Price, 2007). Researchers
claim that victims unconsciously develop SS as a way of psychologically helping him or her
manage the traumatic experience, which may assist the victim in surviving a severe TES (Cantor
& Price, 2007). Twisting reality and making excuses for the perpetrator’s behavior helps the
victim reduce anxiety and stress, but causes the victim to identify and connect emotionally with
the perpetrator. Researchers also claim that the longer the victim experiences the TES, the more
likely SS will develop (Cantor & Price, 2007).
Trauma influences change in one’s ability to control the following five emotions: fear,
panic, anger, trust, and motivation. Bar-Tal (2001) affirms that emotions are a reflection of any
given society and its individuals. Fear can be evoked by non-threatening, conditioned stimuli that
result from societal cues or a specific internal trigger that teaches to fear certain objects, events,
people, or situations, sometimes based on a past traumatic experience (Bar-Tal, 2001). The sense
of uncontrollability of life events—especially early life experiences—can oftentimes lead to
anger, particularly if there is a later threat or danger to the individual. According to Barlow,
Chorpita, & Turovsky (1996), anger is “characterized by a sense of control and mastery…angry
individuals are directing their attention outward toward the source of threat and actively
attempting to cope with the situation” (p. 302). This is in opposition to people experiencing fear.
Fearful people tend not to cope actively with an imposing threat, opting instead to flee the
situation (Barlow et al., 1996). Trust is a key component for the healthy functioning of groups
and the development of societies, as it is essential in building solid relationships (Lewis and
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Weigert, 2001). Lewis & Weigert (1985) claim that trust is not an isolated phenomenon within
an individual; it is dynamic across collective groups, and sociologists determine it is one of the
few, if not the only, alternative to chaos and paralyzing fear between these groups.
Another key aspect important to the development of societies is motivation. Motivation
pushes individuals to improve performance or advance by intrinsic or extrinsic gratification
(autonomous or controlled motivation) (Deci & Ryan, 2008). The innate desire to succeed may
increase or decrease when an outside reward is offered, depending on how it must be earned.
Sometimes, amotivation occurs when people lose any motivation to work at all (Deci & Ryan,
2008). Amotivation—also known as dependency syndrome (DS) or “brain drain”, according to
de Jong (2002)—usually happens when others make decisions and carry out activities for
someone and he or she gets no satisfaction from producing the outcome (Deci & Ryan, 2008).
Long-standing refugees are one example of a social group who usually develop learned
helplessness and/or dependency syndrome (Baron, 2002) because of trauma and/or handouts.
Self-determination theory (Deci & Ryan, 2008) claims that autonomous motivation meets
the psychological needs for achievement, intimacy, and control, leading to greater psychological
health and improved healthy behaviors. Controlled motivation, on the other hand, is external
regulation of one’s actions and is based on a reward/punishment system (Deci & Ryan, 2008).
The will to develop or improve performance is enhanced by external motivators, such as fear,
outside approval, an avoidance of shame, and a desire to boast. Moreover, controlled motivation
tends to drain energy (Deci & Ryan, 2008) and leaves the individual in a psychological state of
inferiority, hopelessness, and despair.
Not every person who undergoes trauma suffers severe consequences, such as extreme
mistrust or psychopathological disorder. Many things determine an individual’s mastery or
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resiliency (resistance and recovery) to a negative or traumatic event (Yehuda, Flory, Southwick,
& Charney, 2006). Some determinants for resiliency and post-traumatic growth (PTG) include a
feeling of control over early-life stressors (Yehuda et al., 2006), proximity to the disaster and if
an individual’s circle of personal resources was affected directly (Schaefer & Moos, 1998). For
example, Schaefer & Moos (1998) explain that PTG occurs less commonly in populations where
large-scale disasters (natural or man-made) and epidemics were rampant, and whole families and
societies were involved. This involuntary involvement destroys social and emotional ties and the
capacity of families and communities to supply support or resources to victims. Dyregrov,
Gupta, Gjestad, & Mukanoheli (2000) add that the destruction of community ties, in addition to
collective coping mechanisms and support, induce children’s emotional disturbances and grief
resulting from traumatic events.
Pham et al. (2004) studied PTSD in Rwanda and found that the more an individual was
exposed to an abundance of traumatic events, the more likely he or she was to develop PTSD
symptoms;30 likewise, he or she would also be less likely to support reconciliation efforts and
believe in community interdependence. Schaefer & Moos (1998) add that it may take months or
years for an individual to develop PTG, if at all. It is common and necessary for someone to
experience a period of distress and grief beforehand. However, people need to resolve their
depression and anger (even if partially) before any growth can occur (Schaefer & Moos, 1998).
Adults and children receive their stress through their environments (de Jong, 2002). The
most common post-traumatic stress symptoms (PTSS) in adults immediately following trauma
are emotional distress and negativity, vulnerability, helplessness, hopelessness or powerlessness,
despair, intense panic, acute stress, and dissociation (de Jong, 2002 and et al., 1995). Poverty

30

Favila (2009) emphasizes that biological, cultural, and situational elements may influence the experiencing, and reporting of trauma symptoms
by survivors in Rwanda.
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aggravates the unbalance of emotional well-being and misery of traumatized adults (Favila,
2009), and the effects of trauma sustain poverty. Children may also endure one or all of the
PTSS adults suffer, depending on their age, and the severity and duration of the trauma (de Jong,
2002). PTSS in children influence improper emotional, behavioral, cognitive, and social
functioning and lead to secondary depression and personality disorders31 (Aldwin & Sutton,
1998; Demaria, Barrett, Kerasiotis, Rohlih, & Chemtob, 2006; de Jong, 2002).
A 1995 study by Neugebauer, Fisher, Turner, Yamabe, Sarsfield, & Stehling-Ariza
(2009), done throughout Rwanda with about 3,000 children ages 8-19 years old, found that over
90% of these children had witnessed the eight dimensions of trauma during the genocide. Fiftyfour to sixty-two percent met the norms for ‘probable PTSD’. Among the children most highly
exposed to trauma, the rates of probable ‘PTSD’ were found to be 100%. The study concluded
that large scale, man-made violence eliminates psychological resilience (Neugebauer et al.
2009), supporting Schaefer & Moos’s (1998) claims on PTG.
The effect trauma plays on an individual does not necessarily dissipate in a month, a year,
or even several years after the horrific event. Without appropriate counseling, complex trauma
can seep into the subconscious of the victim and wreck havoc on his or her psyche. As Dyregrov
et al. (2000) and de Jong (2002) explain, time does not heal psychological wounds for many
people, and children can be affected when their caretakers are greatly distressed. Traumatic
neuroses invade the mind of survivors through a process of forgetting and remembering (Leed,
2000) and may be signs or contributors of post-traumatic stress.
Forty-five years after World War II and several years after the Gulf War, studies proved

31

According to case studies conducted in Cambodia, Mozambique, Algeria, Sri Lanka, Somalia, Northern Uganda and Iraq, both school-aged
children and adolescents who witnessed traumatic events developed severe behavioral abnormalities, inadequate memory performance, and a
block in their cognitive thinking from poor concentration (de Jong, 2002). The research suggests that these inhibitions may interfere with
future school performance of other traumatized children and adolescents in similar contexts (Dyregrov et al., 2000 and Somasundaram &
Jamunanantha, 2002) and cause them to have detrimental effects in family and social life, and later in the work force.
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victims were still suffering from many mental disorders and physical diseases due to the
conditions they had witnessed (Dyregrov et al., 2000 and Leed, 2000). PTSS in survivors is often
suppressed, denied, or forgotten (Kellerman, 2001) and can be passed to other members of the
family (secondary traumatic stress), especially from mother to child (Aït Sidhoum et al., 2002;
de Jong, 2002; Figley & Kleber, 1995) one, two, or possibly many generations later
(transgenerational trauma) (Kellerman, 2001 and Scharf, 2007). Reuben Hill created the ABC-X
Model of Family Stress to study the effects of stress on a family and coping mechanisms used in
order to understand a family’s resilience to a traumatic event (Goddard & Allen, 1991).32
Psychosocial services in Rwanda for survivors are limited, according to Rogoff (2009)33,
which means that many Rwandans may still be suffering from trauma, as well as their children.
Favila’s (2009) investigation on the treatment of PTSD in Rwanda revealed that in 2008 only
three psychiatrists were working throughout the country. The investigation also showed that
where programs for diagnosis and treatment (counseling) of trauma and PTSD existed through
NGO and GOR partnerships, they have largely disappeared to make room for HIV prevention
and treatment programs. Many of these programs following the genocide were insensitive to
Rwandan culture and the context of genocide. Favila (2009) explains that any available
counseling treatment given today in Rwanda typically is stationed in Kigali, leaving the majority
of the rural population unable to receive help because of a lack of resources for locals to come to
Kigali and for organizations to go to the rural areas. Furthermore, mental health programs today
tend to categorize survivors under the labeled roles of “victims” or “perpetrators”.
The studies done in Sudan, Algeria, Cambodia, Sri Lanka, Northern Uganda, and

32

In the ABC-X Model, A = the traumatic event or stressor, B = what resources or family strengths are available, C = meaning attached to the
event, X = (the level of) crisis and stress. The A, B, and C components combined determine the X component.

33

Association Rwandaise des Conseilleurs de Trauma (ARCT-Ruhuka) is one local NGO that offers psychosocial counseling through trained
Rwandan counselors (Rogoff, 2009).
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Mozambique prove that psychosocial reactions34 are part of the cultural coping strategies used by
survivors and have become an inescapable part of daily life. These coping strategies can lead to a
lack of motivation, helplessness, hopelessness, and fear among victims, which may change
family, community, and cultural structures (Aït Sidhoum et al., 2002 and Somasundaram &
Jamunanantha, 2002). Modifications in cultural norms may make a society whose culture is
predominately collectivist into one that is primarily individualist, and vice versa.
When one looks at sociological studies in different contexts, one generally finds that in
collectivist cultures, conformity is common, relationships are intense, deep, and stable, and
interdependence is practiced. On the other hand, in individualist cultures, relationships are
usually detached and not as intimate, and self-reliance is accentuated (Triandis, Bontempo,
Villareal, Asai, & Lucca, 1988). In collectivist cultures, the focus is on the in-group (the intimate
group of social relations and interactions) rather than the individual. However, individuals have
few obligations to the group and are free to do one’s business, compete, and achieve as one
wishes without needing to regard the in-group in individualist cultures. (Asai et al., 1988).
Naturally, as time progresses, they change, but, an event as devastating as war or disaster has a
huge impact on the culture. The conflict or catastrophe can influence a society’s cultural norms
so much so, that certain elements of a society’s individualist or collectivist culture change as
people adapt to the situation and their circumstances.
Individuals in a predominately collectivist-characterized culture begin to behave in ways
of predominately individualist-characterized cultures and vice versa. One example of this is the
collective coping strategies of a collectivist culture. Collectivist cultures emphasize in-group

34

These psychosocial reactions include PTSS; anxiety and panic disorders (e.g. separation and general anxiety, social and agoraphobia from
living with insecurity, threats, and possible revenge); deep suspicion and mistrust; profound fear of leaders, community groups; and individual
community members; self-reservation; avoidance; denial; anger outburst and cruelty; and silence (Aït Sidhoum et al., 2002; Kumar, 2002;
Somasundaram & Jamunanantha, 2002). Another probable psychosocial reaction is telling lies to protect oneself in a society of post-conflict
(protracted and internal) and/or one with an authoritarian/totalitarian regime.
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(subgroup) harmony and collective coping, which usually makes dealing with unpleasant life
events easier (Asai et al., 1988). When an entire country has been affected by a protracted
conflict, people become scared, angry, or indifferent to fellow community members. Coming
together as a group with deep relationships to help each other cope with the trauma is difficult
and almost non-existent. Therefore, that feature of the culture changes and starts to reflect the
attribute of less intimate relationships of the in-group, typically found in individualistic cultures.
Oftentimes after large-scale traumatic events such as a war, genocide, or conflict, the
social fabric of the community is shredded, and collective trauma seizes the population. Baron
(2002) reports from interviews with Sudanese refugees, “the overall personality of the family and
community changes…As an overall group they were now less trusting and more fearful of each
other and less motivated to help each other” (pg. 167). A conflict implicates much more than the
opposing sides; whole societies become involved and pay the consequences of such chaos, “not
only when it takes the form of explicit violence, but even when the violence is muted” Kelman
states (2007, p. 69). Brahimi (2007) summarizes the reality of the atmosphere in post-conflict
countries well when he says, “there is an absence of war, but not necessarily real peace” (p. 3)—
real peace internally within an individual and externally among community members. Van de Put
& Eisenbruch (2002) describes trauma to be “pervasive, massive, chronic, complex, and
multilayered” (p. 106). Victims of complex trauma view and accept the effects of trauma as a
normal part of life (de Jong, 2002; Van de Put and Eisenbruch, 2002).
The steadfast change in the fundamental character of a community due to internal,
protracted conflict dictates and controls individual PTG and societal development, including
collective reconciliation. Thereby, a new social fabric of the afflicted society is established with
new cultural norms creating a special culture that is defined by the traumatic event. These
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changes in a community’s personality can be phrased as a post-conflict culture. What existed
before the conflict either changes so radically due to trauma, or is nearly destroyed during the
struggle of the conflict. Demaria and Wright (2006) describe two dominant processes of a postconflict culture as:
The ways in which a cultural system successfully reproduces and even consolidates itself by
inscribing conflict into its dominant practices and…the ways in which a conflict constitutes a
symbolic encounter that threatens to deeply affect, even to transform, the meanings that make
up the fabric of any culture (p. 6).
Aït Sidhoum et. al (2002) and Somasundaram and Jamunanantha (2002) put the conflict
and post-conflict setting as, “a complete disruption of normal life patterns…a continuing
atmosphere of fear and terror…a decline in social cohesion and support …They have lost their
way of life and culture” (pp. 227, 228, 402). De Jong (2002) remarks, “the ‘culture of fear’ may
interact with the chronic sequential war traumas and with the daily difficulties of living in a
devastated area, a refugee camp, or a repressive environment” (p. 15). Counter-violence, leaders
(e.g. police forces or community leaders), and gangs or individuals seeking revenge (de Jong,
2002) can be the reason for the culture of fear because of their life-threatening dangers, as well
as physical and economic insecurity, and suspicion of fellow community members (in a
protracted, internal conflict) (Bar-Tal, 2001 and Fischer, 2006). “The dominance of a collective
fear orientation is not the exception, but the rule,” says Bar-Tal (2001, p.619).
A study in post-conflict Bosnia reported that a common survival tactic for citizens is to
use ethnic and political relationships (a psychosocial reaction to their trauma) (Fischer, 2006). In
the post-conflict setting, especially under another oppressing ruler, this could mean that people
may exploit each other and the issue of ethnicity or politics to advance or protect themselves
against revenge. Agger & Jensen (1996) point out that the use of psychological weapons of selfdefense is one mechanism of protection against state terrorism. Stein (1997) highlights that
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weakened institutions and insecurity from internal conflict fabricate a dangerous environment for
civil society. Innocent communal programs end in violent disputes and social disintegration.
Furthermore, Aït Sidhoum et al. (2002) say that insecure living situations are “high traumatic
potentials” that induce severe stress, possibly exceeding an individual’s coping capacity.
Changes in power dynamics along with uncertainty result in recriminations, accusations,
and revenge among populations (Somasundaram & Jamunanantha, 2002). Victims who are
robbed of an individual identity, whose well-being is subjected, and whose freedom is oppressed
are apt to conform to the identity of the group in control (Staub, 2001) for survival. Moreover,
forcing post-conflict reconciliation before people (victims or perpetrators) are psychologically
ready adds to the hate and anger already felt by the population. Favila (2009) states (of postconflict/genocide Rwanda), “Reconciliation is often attempted only within these roles [of victims
or perpetrators]. Instead of promoting unity and reconciliation, a basic philosophy of healing
continues to divide the country” (p. 3). Hamber & Wilson (2002) remark that dissatisfied
survivors see reparations with the truth buried and inadequate justice as “buying silence” and
being at the mercy of state political leaders.
As a result, the unjustified and traumatized survivor continues to harbor rage, seeking
personal justice and revenge. Until proper reintegration and trauma counseling occur, these
perpetual feelings and desires will never dissolve (Hamber & Wilson, 2002). Van de Put &
Eisenbruch (2002) and Somasundaram & Jamunanantha (2002) conclude with accounts of postconflict Cambodia and Sri Lanka: “People learned to simply attend to their immediate needs and
to survive to the next day…A certain gloominess covers everything and has become normal life”
(pp.106 and 229).
According to Favila (2009) who references Neugebaur et al. (2009), only four studies on
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the prevalence of PTSD in Rwanda have been conducted since the genocide—as to date. Studies
of PTSD in other post-conflict countries in sub-Saharan Africa are also scarce (Favila, 2009).
Fifteen years after the genocide, the need still exists for expanding the capacity of existing
mental health treatment programs and investing in new programs to address the underlying
trauma and its impact on the capacity of individuals and communities to rebuild effectively
after war (Favila, 2009, p. 5).

2.2. Leadership
Bolman & Deal (2003), and Vroom & Jago (2007) explain that leadership is the ability to
inspire and influence others. The behaviors of leaders do not necessarily come from their
personality or characteristics, but arise from situations they encounter, thereby determining if the
leadership is effective or ineffective. Under the political leadership frame of Bolman & Deal
(2003), an effective political leader advocates, negotiates, and uses a process of advocacy and
coalition building to lead. In contrast, a dictator is an example of an ineffective political leader
(Bolman & Deal, 2003 and Karekezi, 2004) who uses manipulation and fraud to lead and keep
power (Bolman & Deal, 2003). Vroom & Jago (2007) assert, “leader behavior can therefore be
an effect of subordinate behavior as well as a cause of it” (p.19).
As said by Karekezi (2004), leaders fall under one of the following five leadership styles:
democratic/team, authoritarian/command and control, laissez-faire, country club, and
organizational.35 Tolbert & Hall (2009) insert that there are four styles of decision-making
leaders use: authoritarian (centralized bureaucratic/top-down), consultative/popular support
(decentralized bureaucratic/down-top), delegative, and group-based (participative).
Two theories—Theory X and Theory Y—describe how a style of leadership can cause a
leader’s assumptions of his or her followers to come true, a “self-fulfilling prophecy” people live
35

Democratic/team leadership: leader is concerned about productivity and people. Authoritarian/command and control leadership: leader is
concerned about productivity but not about people. Laissez-faire leadership: leader is not concerned about productivity or people. Countryclub: leader is concerned about people but not productivity. Organizational leadership: leader works well when people identify the problem.
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up to the expectations you give them and in the ways you treat them (Bolman & Deal 2003, pp.
118-119). According to Bolman & Deal (2003), there are two types of Theory X leadership: soft
and hard. The leaders who use the soft-version of Theory X leadership try to avoid conflict and
satisfy everyone’s needs. This style creates superficial harmony and relationships, apathy, and
indifference. People voluntarily obey authority if they believe the authority to be legitimate and
working for them (Bolman & Deal, 2003).
Hard-version (HV) Theory X-type leaders use intimidation, tight controls, threats, and
punishments to keep control and power through authoritarian rule. They believe their
subordinates are lazy, passive, and indifferent, but also fear losing control and authority (Bolman
& Deal, 2003). According to Bolman & Deal (2003), the HV Theory X leadership style leads to
low productivity, antagonism, militant unions, and subtle sabotage after some time. Theory X
leadership, hard or soft versions, may lead to angry, unmotivated, or indifferent subordinates.
The most effective leaders use Theory Y, creating conditions in which people can satisfy
and meet their own needs and goals by facilitating their efforts towards fulfilling, organizational
rewards (Bolman & Deal, 2003). Rwanda’s president, Paul Kagame, is, in many people’s
opinion, a Theory Y leader, because of the speed in which Rwanda’s demolished infrastructure
was rebuilt. Kagame promotes Imiganda36 (community volunteer work days) as a means of
development through community cooperation and partnership. Nationwide umuganda is held
monthly, and local imiganda are held as often as each individual district, sector, cell, or village
decides—usually weekly; attendance to umuganda is mandatory. The GOR cites activities
carried out at umuganda include building schools, digging roads, and cleaning up trash
(Government of Rwanda, 2012).
People respond in various ways to overcontrolling leadership. Bolman & Deal
36

Umuganda is the singular for imiganda.
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(2003) name six examples: (a) withdraw from the job by being chronically absent or quitting
altogether (b) stay on the job, but withdraw psychologically, becoming passive and apathetic
(c) resist by restricting output and/or conducting revenge (d) try climbing the hierarchy to better
jobs (e) form alliances to redress the power imbalance (f) teach their children that work is
unrewarding and advancement opportunities are slim. Karekezi (2004) adds that these responses
often are seen in rural communities led by local leaders with authoritarian-style leadership, using
a centralized bureaucratic approach to decision-making.
Rwandans communicate within the set administrative hierarchical structure of the
society. Information is commonly passed through a social network of peers from the bottom (the
village-level) and traveling to the top (the government and institutions) of the hierarchy. Direct
communication is rarely given without passing through the necessary hierarchical levels.
Traditionally, it is socially unacceptable to jump these levels, whether there is a problem to be
addressed or a visitor to be introduced. Kajyambere (2009) states, “The hierarchy in Rwanda was
a vertical system of management and absolute subordination…This obedience to structure is the
foundation upon which the culture of the Rwanda citizen was built”
(talesfromrwanda.blogspot.com). Kajyambere (2009) explains that Rwandans are taught early on
to respect and obey the hierarchy; therefore, a “yes” answer does not always indicate agreement
with a received proposition, order, or question.
Poor leadership has a tendency to be corrupt, with leaders prospering at the cost of the
population. In post-conflict countries, leaders may either persuade/coerce the population to take
revenge, or accept and follow their politics. Good leadership, however, is the cornerstone of
positive post-conflict/disaster development, particularly at the local level. Diamond (2006)
emphasizes that when a conflict or civil war in which a rebel force has come to power, control is

21

established quickly over the state. Historically, this action does not bring much-needed
democracy to the state, but usually replaces one dictator with another (Diamond, 2006), causing
more protracted conflict and continuing the cycle of violence. Kelman (2007) explains that
newly conquered dictator leaders (or parties) may continue to have fears of being dominated, and
so are frequently on the lookout for potential opposition attacks. They establish strict laws and
punishments, on those who are seen as potential enemies. Somasundaram & Jamunanantha
(2002) illustrate:
At these shifts in power, recriminations, accusations, and revenge were very common. Those
with leadership qualities…and those with social motivation…have either been [sic]
intimidated into leaving, killed, or made to fall silent. Gradually, people have been made to be
very passive and submissive (p. 229).
Authorities and the elite have the opportunity in conflict situations to unite people to
improve current life conditions, but instead strive to keep people fearful of each other and
divided (Staub, 1999). Customary threats by new national leaders aid in the establishment of
dominance by stirring up additional social fears already within the collective fear orientation of
unquestioning, authority-respecting, blindly patriotic, obedient subordinates found in monolithic
and authority-oriented cultures (Staub, 2001). As said by Agger & Jensen (1996), “silent and
invisible people are easier to manipulate and dominate” (p. 228). Dictator leaders also
manipulate traumatic memories or old fears and feelings of vulnerability (Kelman, 2007). Staub
(2000) affirms:
Accustomed to being led…people…are unlikely to oppose leaders…Related to this is a
monolithic (versus pluralistic) culture. The less varied are the values in a society, the less
freedom to express them, the less likely that people will oppose the evolution of
hostility...These tendencies are intensified in an authoritarian political system…(p. 3).
Staub (1999) references Gourevich who says, “Reports from Rwanda indicate that orders by
authorities to kill had a powerful influence” (p. 184).
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The current ruling military party of Rwanda is the RPF [Rwandan Patriotic Front] (Uvin,
2001). Many observers believe the party dominates Rwandan politics, and observations reveal
the rise of human rights abuses by the RPF; whoever negatively judges and defies the
government and its decisions meet violent consequences (Uvin, 2001).37 The manipulation and
installation of collective needs and fears through the promotion of nationalism and patriotism are
seen as necessary for the sake of maintaining power. It is also a green light for policies and
actions the government deems crucial (Kelman, 2007). In other words, “the very manipulation of
uncertainties is one of the principal characteristics of power” (Demaria & Wright, 2006, p. 8).
Political leaders (of conflict and post-conflict states) strive to make sure they do not
appear weak or gullible to their public through carefully planned decisions demonstrated through
their negotiations, public announcements, and style of educating the public. Shaping public
opinion about the conflict—displaying the issues and setting limits of acceptable action—are
important in ensuring compliance from their subordinates (Kelman, 2007). Changing historical
facts after the conflict by controlling discourse about it is also a sure way of showing strength
and attaining obedience. As Agger & Jensen (1996) explain: “Psychological warfare is an
integral part of state terrorism” (p. 3).
Nationalism preaches unconditional support of the state. Never opposing political
agendas produces statewide ignorance, increasing blind acceptance. People who counter the
dominant policy quickly become a minority and are hesitant to speak out against the accepting
majority (Kelman, 2007). The public’s enforced acceptance to the new norms shows group
loyalty. Those who go against these norms or the decisions and discourse of the authorities are
seen as traitors. Consequently, antagonistic acts (threatening, jailing, and killing) are justified as

37

See Keith Harmon Snow’s (2009) article, The Rwanda Genocide Fabrications: Human Rights Watch, Alison Des Forges & Disinformation on
Central Africa at www.allthingspass.com for more information.

23

self-defense and patriotic duty (Kelman, 2007). Meanwhile, internal bystanders find it hard to
dissent, so they remain passive and even devalue the “traitors” as the enemy, justifying their
indifference and reducing their guilt. These means may cause the bystanders to become
perpetrators in conflict situations (Staub, 2001), as well as post-conflict societies with new
fearful and revengeful leaders.
The post-conflict society is a breeding ground for “brain drain” (DS) and corruption.
After a war or disaster, large quantities of aid money from the international community provide
opportunities for corruption and greed (Ware & Noone, 2008)—sometimes at the exploitation of
victims’ grief (de Jong, 2002). Le Billon (2008) describes the corruption in post-conflict
societies as criminal and informal (economic) activities, poor transparency, lack of
accountability and checks and balances, and mafia-type bullying by war veterans and exiles who
are now local and national authorities. They use corruption for payback by increasing their
personal wealth, and later, their social status (Le Billon, 2008). The mismanagement and stealing
of aid funds in the post-conflict scene by leaders can make local governments untrustworthy. To
mask the corruption, leaders force division, hate, and fear propaganda onto subordinate citizens,
who then consequently also engage in corruption as a way of surviving in a national-led
corrupted state (Le Billon, 2008).
For their own personal gain, leaders tactically assign jobs, contracts, loans, and grants to
certain local elite groups. Even those in non post-conflict states may give in to corruption when
an opportunity with a NGO development project arises and “temptation often overcomes duty”
(Noone & Ware, 2008, p. 195). Kumar & Corbridge (2002) give an example of local corruption
in their case study of a grass-roots development agriculture project in rural India. When
attempting participatory planning, development agents ran into the problem of locals identifying
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elite villagers as the project’s beneficiaries over the targeted, more vulnerable ones. The elite
villagers misrepresented their economic income to profit from the benefits of the project and as a
result, the targeted poorest of the poor were falling farther into impoverishment while the people
who did not need the project were increasing their social capital and income.
As described earlier with self-determination theory, people need to have motivated goals
to accomplish a sense of psychological well-being and betterment of themselves. Somasundaram
& Jamunanantha (2002) give several examples from post-conflict Sudan, Algeria, Cambodia, Sri
Lanka, Northern Uganda, and Mozambique of how the constant flow of aid and “free extrinsic
rewards” initiate “brain drain” (DS), especially in the immediate aftermath of a war or disaster:
…once the work ethic had dominated this hard working society. Most are now inclined not to
work, merely sign their names in the work register, and take the day off at a [sic] slightest
excuse…There is a complete lack of quality in all aspects of society, partly due to crippling
brain drain (p. 229).
Musoni (2003) attests to this when he studied the role of foreign aid in Rwanda. He claims that
the mere labeling of a project with certain names, such as World Bank, USAID, UNICEF, etc.
can cause an immediate image of receiving free material goods in the minds of the local citizens
and government leaders. “Until the genocide, Rwanda was one of the most aided countries in the
world…The immediate post-conflict years were characterised [sic] by high levels of relief
oriented assistance” (Musoni, 2003, pp. 8 & 6). The associated DS thus reduces project
ownership and motivating energies towards self-sufficiency (Musoni, 2003), encouraging locals
to appease development agents in exchange for goods. From experiences with a project in postconflict Liberia, Fearon, Humphreys, and Weinstein (2009) caution that “individuals in treatment
communities may have learned how to respond in ways that would please outside funders" (pp.
288 and 289).
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2.3. Weaknesses in the Literature
The empirical literature is replete with studies on the effects of individual trauma—
especially PTSD—and accounts of collective trauma in post-conflict societies. The topics of
dependency syndrome, post-conflict and post-disaster reconstruction, peace and reconciliation—
with the cycles of hatred and violence—and organizational leadership—including corruption in
organizations—also are profuse.
Perhaps the most lacking in studies pertaining to post-conflict development is the effect
of trauma and authoritarian (especially totalitarian) leadership on implementing community
development projects at the grassroots level of post-conflict/genocide societies. There are many
examples/theories of why development projects often do not accomplish their goals. There are
also many theories about the causes of protracted conflicts. However, few studies exist showing
the effects of protracted conflicts on the real sustainability of community development projects
in the post-conflict scene. The research on the TACP examined the following three issues: (a)
how trauma psychologically affects a post-conflict/post-genocide society and creates a special
culture with unique needs (b) post-conflict leadership (c) corruption in a post-conflict society.
The research will contribute to the existing literature how these issues influence the execution
and sustainability of community development projects.
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RESEARCH DESIGN
3.1. Culture of the Chosen Inquiry
As previously stated, the culture of the conducted qualitative research is both a
phenomenological study as well as a descriptive case study based on my experience with the
TACP at GPS in the individual rural community of Gitarama.

3.2. Detail of the Data Collection Methods Used
3.2.1. The Research Participants
Forty-one individuals participated in three separate research groups. Twenty-six of the 41
research participants (RPs) were TAC project stakeholders (PSs)—nine children and 14
parents/guardians TAC club members—and three local leaders (LLs) from GPS and the
Gitarama Cell administrative office. These individuals made up the first and second groups of
RPs. The third group of 15 RPs consisted of community members from 15 additional families in
Gitarama who were identified using the project IC38 in a second selection of project beneficiaries
(PBs). Ten other community members, targeted to engage in the research, were not available,39
leaving 41 participants (80%) of the original 51 selected who participated.40 Table 5 gives age

38

Identification of the first group of PBs was based on criteria written by GPS leaders and myself at a project design meeting. See Appendix D,
under Twizere Agriculture Club Project Description, for the IC (p. 102).

39

Thirty was number of club members targeted to participate in the research because the original number of club members in TAC was 15
parents/guardians and 15 children. However, it was confirmed that one whole family (one adult and one child club member) had moved to
another town, and five other children left GPS to attend school in other cells (although their families continued to live in Gitarama).
Furthermore, one child had graduated primary school and left GPS to attend secondary school in Kibuye. This reduced the original number of
PB interviewees’ from 15 adults to 14 and from 15 children to nine. The six LLs the most directly involved with the TACP originally were
chosen to participate in the research. These LLs gave advance verbal permission to be interviewed, but three out of the six were consistently
absent due to numerous obligatory government-directed meetings.

40

The 23 club members and the three LLs (26 PSs) who participated in the research were targeted because they were directly involved in the
TACP. The last 15 RPs were selected to participate in the research as a way to investigate the suspicion that GPS personnel inappropriately
selected the initial group of TAC PBs when given control over identification. There were indeed others who fit the criteria better than those
who were originally chosen. Before a government meeting, a group of villagers assisted me in creating a list of some of the poorest families
from all eight villages of Gitarama using the IC. As with so many other development projects, the inapt identification of the first group of PBs
might indeed have contributed heavily to the constraints faced in the project, preventing the poorest of the poor in getting the help they needed.
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Table 5

PROJECT
STAKEHOLDERS
INTERVIEWED
(N = 26)

Gender and Age Demographics of Twizere Agriculture Club
Project Stakeholder Research Participants
GENDER

AGE
(Years)
10-13

14-17

18-24

M

TOTAL

25-34

35-44

1

45+

(T = Total number of
persons per gender)

1

2

APBs
F

1

4

7

12

M

2

3

5

F

2

2

4

CPBs

M

0

LLs
F

1

1

1

3

Table 5 Key:
M = Male
F = Female

APBs = Adult Project Beneficiaries
CPBs = Child Project Beneficiaries

LLs = Local Leaders

and gender demographics of the 26 TAC PS RPs. 41
To reduce confusion, clarification of the different names for the groups of people
involved in the TACP and in this research, is necessary. The PBs were the initial chosen club
members of TAC; the PSs included these PBs and LLs directly involved in the TACP. More
specifically, the adult project beneficiaries (APBs) were the parent/guardian club members, and
the child project beneficiaries (CPBs) were the child club members. Group 1 project
beneficiaries (Gr1 PBs) is used to distinguish the first group of PBs selected by GPS personnel
from the second group of PBs (Gr2 PBs) identified as part of this research. For the duration of
this paper, the club members are referred to as PBs; the parent/guardian club members as APBs;
the child club members as CPBs; and the three LL RPs as LL A, LL B, and LL C.
41

There was no age or gender data collected on the second identified group of 15 PB families.
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3.2.2. The Research Questionnaires and Survey
The primary data collection method was two questionnaires and a survey used during
interviews with each RP group created by myself, the researcher.42 The two questionnaires were
designed for TAC PSs. These questionnaires centered on obtaining information about the
TACP—its strengths and limitations—through the experiences, observations, and opinions of the
PSs, as well as RPs’ suggestions on project design and implementation improvement strategies.
They are labeled constraints questionnaire 1 (CQ1) used with the PBs and constraints
questionnaire 2 (CQ2) used with the LLs. CQ 1 and CQ2 consisted of mostly open-ended
questions allowing the recipients to express themselves freely. Different questions were used for
the two groups of PSs based on the roles they held in the project.
The survey administered was a wealth index survey (WIS). It was given to Gr1 PBs and
to Gr2 PBs.43 As previously stated, Gr2 PBs were identified to verify the suspicion that Gr1 PBs
were inaccurately chosen. The second group was selected from throughout Gitarama using the
project baseline IC. The WIS was used with a family member from each of the second group of
15 families identified, as well as with each parent/guardian club member from the first group of
PBs (total of 29 persons). It contained both open and close-ended questions to gather basic
information about the wealth status of each chosen beneficiary household.44 The purpose of the
WIS was to compare the standard of living of the first group of possibly poorly identified PBs
42

See Appendix E, The Research Questionnaires and Survey (p. 110).

43

Only adults in Gr1 PBs and GR PBs participated in the WIS.

44

In a typical WIS, participants are not asked what they typically eat or the number of times a day they eat. Instead, the WIS focuses more on
evaluating the assets of each household. However, because of the nature of Rwandan culture, some of the typical questions had to be adapted
to fit the context. For example, asking a local if they have a toilet, clothes, food stocks, and domestic tools is considered offensive. Therefore,
the information of the availability of these assets and the wealth of each household was collected by observation at the Gr2 PB’s house,
personal judgment from conversations with interviewees’ neighbors (if not at home), and with other locals about rural life in Rwanda.
Information was also obtained by giving interviewees the option of sharing what wealth they have through the questions what other assets do
you own? how many times a day do you eat? and what do you typically eat a day? In a 2008 district baseline survey, BS had a population of
20,381 habitants (National Institute of Statistics of Rwanda, 2008); this number likely has increased over the last few years. In 2008, BS was
one of three most densely populated sectors in KD with between 438 to 562 people per square kilometer (National Institute of Rwanda, 2008).
Wealthier locals who reside elsewhere own most of the land in Gitarama, leaving the majority of Gitarama locals owning no land or just the
small plot on which their house is built (which is why the microgarden methods were appropriate to teach). Therefore, the question how many
times a year do you cultivate? was a suitable question to discover if they cultivate on their own land, sharecrop, or do neither.
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with a second selected group to confirm if the first group of selected PBs was the closest fit to
the IC, or if there were other families who could indeed meet them all.
3.2.3. The Interviews
Each RP took part in a private, one-on-one interview where only the interviewee, my
counterpart (serving as translator), and I were present.45 These interviews were conducted in a
location of the interviewee’s choice (e.g. his or her home, GPS, the fields, Kibuye town, places
of work, etc.). Since the CQ 1 and CQ 2 focused primarily on understanding the project’s
constraints, the interview in which these questionnaires were used with TAC PSs, was labeled
the constraints interview (CI). Furthermore, the WIS was given to Gr1 PBs during their CI, while
Gr2 PBs partook only in the WIS during a separate interview labeled, the wealth index interview
(WII). Before the CIs, each TACP RP was given a set of instructions that explained the purpose
of the interview and their rights as RPs, as well as a consent form. APBs were given an
additional consent form for their participating minor children.
Observation in the field (at Gitarama and other places in Rwanda during different
experiences) served as the secondary data collection method. Observation included formal and
informal conversations with LLs, PBs, GPS teachers, and other community members during the
project design and implementation phases, as well as direct and indirect observation and notetaking during various project activities46 and visits to Gitarama.
3.2.4. The Variables
The independent variables are the age, gender, socio-economic status, hierarchical
position in society, degrees of past traumatic experiences, and the proximity to the conflict of
45

Private, one-on-one interviews were chosen over focus groups because of the civil society context of Rwanda. Because of the genocide, civil
war, and ethnic division and hatred among the civilians, people probably would have felt very vulnerable, scared, and reluctant to speak out
about the problems in the project, and voice their opinions and suggestions if interviewed in a focus group. I wanted to give them a safe and
secure atmosphere where they could feel free to speak without fear of revenge and further disputation.

46

Executed project activities included construction of the chicken coop, purchasing of the animals, the elections of TAC’s parent committee
(PCOM) members, and a few TAC meetings.
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each individual community member, as well as the extent to which the community was affected.
The dependent variable is the planning and implementation effectiveness of local development
projects in post-conflict societies. In an ideal empirical analysis, multiple local development
projects in the post-conflict society would be studied, and the dependent variable measured,
through various means, in each of these projects. Then, the importance of each independent
variable affecting the dependent variable would be examined, and the findings recorded in a
regression analysis.

3.3. How the Data Collected was Analyzed in Light of the Conceptual Frameworks
The data analysis methods included not only examining the constraints of the project, but
also the strengths as well. The CI responses were examined and the questions 1, 13, and 14 were
found to be similar and relevant in finding the strengths. The responses of the PS interviewees to
questions 1, 13, and 14 were then studied to determine three factors: whether the interviewee
(a) expressed he or she liked the project (b) showed recognition that he or she (the chosen
beneficiaries) needed the project (c) he or she showed recognition that he or she understood the
project’s goals. The number of PSs that showed evidence of supporting the above three factors
was tallied and percentages for each were found. Observations in the field were added to the
analysis of the strengths (See Figure 13 in the analysis—p. 36).
Each constraint mentioned by interviewees in the CIs was tallied and grouped into one of
four categories (depending on who had the most influence on the constraint)—leaders (Rwandan
leadership), the parent committee (PCOM), project beneficiaries (adult and child club
members), and a combination of leaders, the PCOM, and PBs. The frequency of each disclosed
constraint was calculated (see Table 7 in the analysis—p. 38). The other questions on both the
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CQ1 and CQ2 were combined based on the similarity of their content and the PS RPs responses
to these questions were analyzed. The PS RPs responses to the CQ1 were analyzed separately
from those of the CQ2 because the two questionnaires held audience-specific questions.
The analysis consisted of comparing and contrasting the field data with theoretical
frameworks in the existing literature to determine the possible causes of the documented
constraints. A distinct correlation between the data and Rwandan leadership, post-conflict
trauma, and dependency on outside assistance led to using theoretical frameworks of
authoritarian leadership style, particularly HV Theory X leadership, post-conflict corruption, the
Rwandan administrative and political hierarchies, dependency syndrome, and individualist and
collectivist societies. Theories on post-traumatic trauma, including PTSD, CPTSD, DESNOS,
PTSS, SS, secondary traumatic stress, transgenerational trauma (including the ABC-X Model),
and case studies on the dynamics of post-conflict societies also were explored and applied during
data analysis.
The wealth of Gr1 PBs and Gr2 PBs were measured by comparing the two groups’
responses to the WIS. Because the WIS was adapted to fit Rwandan culture, the analysis was
also adapted. The responses of the first four questions of each WIS were charted, and while the
last two questions were not, they aided in determining to which category of wealth the family
belonged. Assets were given a grade of A-F (excluding E).47 Based on information from the
interviewees and field observations, each family was classified under a wealth category of wellto-do, better, poor, and destitute. The positions in society that the PBs hold and their
relationships with specific community members also were examined. Where personal

47

The scoring of the WIS did not include only the assets of each family interviewed. The number of meals eaten daily by the family, the status
employment of the family, and other assets, such as owning land were also used to score wealth. Additional observations were not utilized in
the scoring; instead, they supplied extra evidence comparing the families’ wealth in both groups. Some adults of the Gr2 PBs were not home at
the time of the visit so conversations with neighbors were used instead.
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observations were utilized in this research, I have attempted to identify them as such and
distinguish them clearly from the interview data collected.

3.4. Important Limitations to the Research Design
There were two important limitations to the research design. The first limitation was the
difficulties encountered when attempting to obtain permission from Gitarama and Bwishyura
Sector leaders to conduct the interviews with Gr1 PBs and Gr2 PBs. The LL’s tight controls
caused significant delays to implement each step of the project, as well as the research.48 The
issue was finally resolved after a Peace Corps Staff member came to Gitarama and held
additional meetings with crucial leaders and myself to explain the intent and benefit of having
Peace Corps Volunteers in Rwandan communities in addition to the objective of the research
interviews. The second limitation was that three out of the six targeted LLs were not available to
be interviewed. They were consistently absent when the interviews were conducted due to
numerous required governmental meetings.

48

These steps involved signing essential papers for the project, carrying out club activities, and conducting the CI and WII.
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PRESENTATION AND ANALYSIS OF DATA
4.1. Analysis of the Project’s Strengths
The focus of this analysis is on the constraints of the TACP; however, recognizing the
strengths voiced by PSs in the CIs determines if the project was indeed relevant to the PBs and
leaves room for scrutinizing the constraints that occurred. Besides what was specified in these
interviews, four other major strengths of the project were observed:
(a) The TACP supports the United Nations’ MDGs49 and aligns with two initiatives of
Vision 2020—every home throughout Rwanda has a microgarden50 and every child owns a small
animal. As a result of the TAC being compatible with the GOR, full permission and support was
received from LLs, GPS personnel, and parents of GPS who showed their utmost interest,
excitement, and acceptance in the beginning, demonstrating that collaboration with LLs within
the local administrative hierarchy was achieved.
(b) A partnership between TAC and Peace Health Club at Ruganda Secondary School in
Kibuye was created, resulting in a teaching and learning experience for all.
(c) The design and initial execution of the project involved participation by the GPS
community, which established a role of ownership. Based upon their claim that they best knew
which targeted families in Gitarama had the direst need for the TACP, GPS personnel were given
full charge over the choice of the first group of PBs. Sharing information and deciding together
on the selection of animals to purchase demonstrated the project’s strength of participatory
decision making and ownership among the PSs. They themselves were shaping the project for
their needs instead of passively following the decisions and orders of a foreigner.
49

The TACP supports MDG #1: Eradicate Extreme Poverty and Hunger.

50

Microgardens are new to Gitarama. Possession of at least one microgarden is a requirement by the GOR. See GOR’s Ministry of Health
(MINISANTE) at www.moh.gov.rw and Ministry of Education (MINEDUC) at www.mineduc.gov.rw for more information about these
initiatives.
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(d) The preliminary implementation of the TACP occurred.51
When interviewed, 10 APBs (71%), seven CPBs (78%), and all three LLs (100%)
commented, “The project…has good goals. It can help me to have chickens and rabbits” (CPB);
“The project…can help the whole family” (APB); “The project is a didactic tool that helps
concretely teach things to students and teachers. They are learning practical things through the
project” (LL).This means that more than three-quarters (77%) of PS RPs communicated that they
favored the project, suggesting that it was desired in their community (see Figure 13).
The initial acceptance and support, demonstrated through attendance, enthusiasm,
encouragement, and participation, that the majority of the PSs understood the goal and objective
of the project. More than 50% of all the PSs, specifically, nine APBs (64%), five CPBs (56%),
and two LLs (67%) (62% in total) communicated their understanding by sharing ideas how it
would significantly benefit them. They gave comments demonstrating that the goal and objective
were clear, and reasonable: “The project started well. I was realizing that the project would give
us eggs…the eggs can give us more chickens. We can…sell them…and buy a goat or a cow”
(APB). “Through the project, the children can learn how to properly take care of animals, know
what food to give them, how to treat diseases, among other things” (LL). “…we can sell and eat
eggs…and buy a pen… have good nutrition and solve some of our problems of poverty” (two
CPBs). “The gardening techniques will help us grow a lot of food and reduce malnutrition.
We…need new techniques to improve our crop yield. It is poor and traditional techniques are
hard labor” (APB).
The results of the CIs showed a small percentage of PBs who learned concepts about

51

The preliminary implementation included acceptance and support from LLs, the identification of the PBs, the construction of the animal pens,
the purchase of the animals, and the execution of a few TAC meetings, which included PCOM elections and a few independent meetings with
APBs organized by the PCOM.
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Figure 13
Strengths of the Twizere Agriculture Club Project Told
old by
Project Stakeholder Research Participants in the Constraints Interviews
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animal husbandry, microgardens, and cultivating techniques during the first few meetings.52 A
couple of CPBs reported, “I learned how to test to see if a rabbit is pregnant” and “I learned how
to build animal pens.” However, the research showed that percentages could have been higher if
fewer constraints had existed, preventing further implementation of the project. These results
may be viewed as a weakness of the project; however, a few people did respond positively,
giving further evidence it had some strength despite the many constraints.
Seven APBs (50%), three CPBs (33%), and no LLs (0%) (38% of PSs in total) displayed
recognition that they (the chosen PBs) needed the TACP. Many gave statements in the CIs that
implied that the majority of PSs had not accepted it enough to work willingly for its success.
Three APBs said, “We cannot refuse the project if it is progressing;” “I haven’t noticed any
problems [with the chickens]. But it has been a long time without seeing the animals;” and
“People [were] neglecting the club so much. They did not give it value.” One LL stated, “[The
project] is important, but not enough so someone can progress” (LL). Even if the PSs expressed
that they wanted it, ambiguous statements such as these do not show total acceptance of the
project and willingness to work for its success.

4.2. Analysis of the Constraints in the Project
4.2.1. Presentation of the Constraints in the Project
Table 7 shows the constraints of the TACP as shared privately by the PSs in the CIs.
Nearly all of these voiced constraints also were observed personally throughout several months
of project installation, inspiring this analysis in an effort to understand why they occurred. The
alleged constraints were classified by the researcher and are presented in the middle column of
Table 7, under one of four categories of PSs who produced or affected them in some way.
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See Appendix F, Supplemental Figures and Table of Data, Figures 14 and 15 (pp. 115 & 116).
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Table 7

Presentation of the Constraints in the Twizere Agriculture Club Project
Told by Project Stakeholder Interviewees in the Constraints Interviews

CATEGORIES

CONSTRAINTS

FREQUENCY

(Group primarily
responsible for
constraints in
adjacent column as
classified by
researcher)

(Given by project stakeholders in private interviews)

(N = times
stated in the
constraints
interviews)


LEADERS
(leadership)












PBs are hesitant about approaching GPS and PCOM leaders with problems
in the club
Broken benches (children cannot reach into rabbit hutch to feed rabbits)
Seventh Day Adventists (religious denomination) cannot raise or eat rabbits
Imiganda and government-directed meetings are excessive
The night guard of GPS was given charge of taking care of TAC’s animals
and no decision about this was made by PBs
GPS’s night guard is not competent to take care of the animals
Bad/corrupt leadership and management
The rabbit hutch poorly built
No medication for the animals
No competent veterinarian available
Lack of club trainings
Total: 11

PARENT
COMMITTEE










Members of PCOM are disputing with each other
Members of PCOM are accusing each other of stealing
Lack of responsibility-taking among PCOM
Bad organization of the PCOM
Very poor communication between PCOM members and other PBs
No meetings of the club were organized by the PCOM
The PCOM’s president does not organize meetings for the APBs and uses
the excuse that no one is available for meetings
Poor cooperation among members of the PCOM
Total: 8




PROJECT
BENEFICIARIES
(parent/guardian and
child club members)









PBs abandoned club activities
PBs did not take care of animals properly
PBs lost courage because of lack of others’ support, help, responsibility,
and fighting among each other
PBs project their responsibility in TAC onto others
Poor collaboration between PBs
PBs have personal problems at home
PBs have division among themselves
PBs in different church denominations are divided
Gitarama is a bad location for the TACP because it is far from Kibuye and
it is hard to transport chicken food (from Kibuye to GPS)
Some PBs are unable to leave the house to go to TAC meetings
Total: 10
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1
4
1
8
1
1
2
16
2
3
9
Total: 48
3
1
1
3
1
1
1
1
Total: 12
1
2
1
2
3
1
1
1
1
1
Total: 14

CATEGORIES

CONSTRAINTS

FREQUENCY

(Group primarily
responsible for
constraints in
adjacent column as
classified by
researcher)

(Given by project stakeholders in private interviews)

(N = times
stated in the
constraints
interviews)

COMBINATION
of LEADERS,
PARENT
COMMITTEE, and
PROJECT
BENEFICIARIES



















The rabbits and chickens are hungry
The rabbits and chickens are dying
Domestic jobs (besides imiganda and government meetings) are numerous
PSs are indifferent and do not value the TACP
Chickens are eating their eggs
Rabbits are eating their babies
The animal pens lack sanitation
The screen and the door on the outside of the chicken coop are being
destroyed
Chickens are crowded in the coop and not let free to scavenge
PSs do not have knowledge about raising chickens and rabbits
The TAC animals are not productive
PBs were not informed by the PCOM of club meetings
PBs only come to meetings or feed the animals when they see me present
The chicken coop is too small for all the chickens
The chickens and rabbits are sick
There is not enough chicken or rabbit food
Poor organization of PBs to attend TAC activities (e.g. caring for the
animals)
Total: 17

19
30
4
2
1
1
10
9
8
2
7
3
1
2
11
3
4
Total: 117

Table 7 Key:
APBs = Adult Project Beneficiaries
GPS = Gitarama Primary School

PBs = Project Beneficiaries
PCOM = Parent Committee

TAC = Twizere Agriculture Club
TACP = Twizere Agriculture Club Project

The four categories of PSs are found in the left-side column of Table 7 (see p. 38 & 39).
The PCOM was placed in a category all its own because, even though members of the PCOM are
PBs, they were elected into leadership roles as catalysts of communication, assistance, and
inspiration of project activities to the other PBs and to the community at-large. The fourth
category is a combination of the leaders (leadership), the PCOM, and the PBs because there were
constraints that all three groups influenced. Under each category, the tallied number of times
each particular constraint was articulated in the CIs, and also the total, are found on the right-side
column of Table 7 labeled Frequency.
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The results of the CIs revealed that a majority of the interviewees had observed
constraints that limited the project’s productivity and progression. Specifically, 17 PBs and all
three LLs observed at least one constraint, leaving 19% of the total PS interviewees claiming that
they had not observed any constraints and 4% stating they did not know (see Figure 16, p. 41). In
the CIs, eleven constraints that were instigated by leaders (leadership) were affirmed a total of 48
times. Eight constraints produced by the PCOM were enumerated 12 times, while ten constraints
generated by the PBs were referred to a total of 14 times. Additionally, 17 constraints influenced
by all three groups of PSs were mentioned 117 times.
In Table 7, it is noticed that the combination of stakeholders category classified the
largest number of constraints with the highest frequency (see Figure 17, p. 41). This implies that
all the PSs contributed to the stated constraints in this category because the three groups
negatively influenced each other when joining in partnership. The constraint most reiterated in
this category is “the rabbits and chickens are dying” (30 times). The category that classified the
second largest number of constraints with the second highest frequency is the leaders
(leadership) category. The frequency of the affirmed constraints that pertained exclusively to
leaders almost doubled that of the frequencies in the PBs and PCOM categories combined. This
connotes that as a singular group, Rwandan leaders were the biggest factor in promoting these
constraints. Their powerful capability to influence negative behavior in the TACP suggests their
potentiality also to inspire its success. “The rabbit hutch” is poorly built is the most repeated
constraint (16 times) in this category.
The project beneficiaries category has the third largest number of constraints with the
third highest frequency. The PBs played a role in the constraints as well, because their
teamwork, interest, and motivation for the project came to a halt. The recurring constraint in this
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Figure 17 Frequencies of the Voiced
Constraints in the Twizere
Agriculture Club Project
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Project Beneficiaries

Local Leaders
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(parent/guardian
and child club
members)
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0
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Number of Project Stakeholder Interviewees

Figure 16 Observation of Constraints
by Project Stakeholder
Research Participants

category is “poor
poor collaboration between the project beneficiaries
beneficiaries” (three times). The parent
committee category has the fewest number of constraints declared in the CIs with the lowest
frequency. While issues in the PCOM involving LLs and the other PBs generated some
constraints, members of the PCOM alone induced others.. The restated constraints in this
category were “members
members of the PCOM are disputing with each other
other” and “bad
bad organization
organizat
of
the PCOM” (three times each).
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4.2.2. Leadership in Rwanda
Referring back to Table 7 (p. 38 & 39), one can see that out of all three individual groups
of PSs, the leaders were the cause of the majority of the constraints. This observation can be
explained by how authorities and those in leadership positions are viewed by Rwandans and by
the role they play in the governing of their communities. The relationship between the categories
and the constraints framed in Table 7 will be discussed in the remainder of this analysis.
4.2.2.1 The Administrative Hierarchy versus the RPF Hierarchy
As depicted in the literature review, Rwanda developed into a monolithic society where
authority within its complex system of hierarchies was highly respected and followed with
unquestioning subordination by the citizenry. Individuals who hold positions of power titles
(e.g. head master, doctor, pastor) were, and still are, extremely revered—especially by those of
lower socio-economic status. The modern political hierarchy heightened at the time of
independence and influenced the administrative hierarchy at all levels of society,53 which
continues today. Like the administrative hierarchy leadership that played an historic role in the
genocide, Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) leadership today is a prime determiner in the
sustainability of development projects in Rwanda.
Rwandans show the hierarchy within the political RPF system to be more important than
Rwandan society’s administrative hierarchy. For example, LL A made it known that she is the
vice-president of the RPF chapter in KD. Compared to village chiefs and executive secretaries of
the administrative divisions, she is a figure of lower-status in the cultural administrative
hierarchy because of her occupation at a rural primary school. However, in the RPF hierarchy,
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See the timeline under Appendix B, Significant Events in Rwandan History (p. 94).
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she is a figure of high stature in the local community.54 This position gave her the sanction to go
directly to leaders at the district and sector levels to introduce me and get their approval for the
project, rather than go first to leaders at the village or cell levels. Much of the time, the leaders at
the district and sector levels, as well as the head parishioner of the Catholic Church of Kibuye,
were consulted when addressing the needs of the project. These leaders all hold similar
administrative titles of prestige, not only in KD, but in the RPF as well. For this reason, LL A
considered them more important with whom to confer than the leaders of Kivomo Village55 and
Gitarama; they were sought foremost and more often than the latter.56
One explanation of this higher respect for the RPF hierarchy, over the administrative
hierarchy, is the extreme fear Rwandans have of the government ruling party. This fear affects
their attitudes and actions of day-to-day living. This paper cannot discuss the behaviors of the
LLs who were connected to the TACP without first examining the leadership at the national level
(the top of the administrative and RPF hierarchies), which influences other officials at the lower
levels of the country.
4.2.2.2. Hard-Version Theory X Leadership Style
The RPF is represented in all aspects and dominates all functions of Rwandan society
from the national to the village level. This is apparent when observing how often RPF meetings
and activities are held for the people in Gitarama. Their ruling style reflects the evidence found
in the literature of dominant leaders in conflict and post-conflict societies. The RPF regulates
with an extreme authoritarian/command and control method of leadership with a top-down
approach of decision-making. The HV of Theory X leadership best describes Rwandan leaders’
54

As vice-president, LL A is the second most influential RPF representative in KD. Under the RPF hierarchy, she has more decision-making
power than administrative leaders in the offices of the cells and sectors in KD, as well as in the offices at the (Karongi) district level.
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GPS is located in Kivomo Village.

56

This kind of interaction among other people was observed often during different occasions.
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approach of addressing everyday affairs. The party’s top leaders fear retaliation,57 and so impose
policies that fortify the RPF to keep power and prevent being dominated.
Their strategy is to reinforce the collective fear orientation of the civic society through
tight controls, manipulation, threats, intimidation, and punishments via RPF members at all
levels of the public and private sectors of the country. This reinforcement begins with the high
officials and ends with the villagers via a domino effect down the administrative and RPF
hierarchies. The PB RPs shed light on this strategy through their explanations of required
government-directed activities (meetings and imiganda) for the locals. It is palpable, then, that to
some, the head leader of the RPF is thought to be a dictator, and the government, totalitarian.
The threatening nature of a dictator and conceivable post-conflict trauma explain why many
locals and other leaders work hard to support the RPF, and why others who do not, fear those
who do. Moreover, several locals on separate occasions expressed that as long as they work hard
for the RPF, they will progress and face no problems.
4.2.2.2.1. Tight Controls by Leaders
Four major examples of tight controls by LLs, challenged putting the TACP into practice:
(a) scrutiny when signing papers or granting permission (b) refusal to conduct trainings
(c) GPS’s night guard given duty of TAC animals (d) excessive, mandatory government-directed
activities.
4.2.2.2.1.1. Granting Permission
It was evident that the LLs put tight controls on every action towards implementing TAC.
Written permission with signatures from the appropriate leaders of Gitarama and BS58 was
needed to apply every new change in the execution of the project. Obtaining this permission
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See the timeline under Appendix B, Significant Events in Rwandan History (p. 94).
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often took days since the LLs would take the pending document for further review by higher
authorities, and usually this was not enough. Written permission was followed with further
questions about the intent of the new change. Approval to conduct both the CIs and the WIs also
followed this procedure and eventually, permission was given.
LLs are reluctant to sign their permission for any papers even when they have the
authority to do so, especially if they are farther down the RPF hierarchy. A LL will wait to get
authorization from those leaders in higher positions before giving their approval. Working under
a totalitarian regime heightens the stress and fear of punishment for one’s personal actions. One
example is the hesitation by a powerful LL in Gitarama who would not give written permission
to conduct the interviews until he first consulted with a more powerful LL of BS as well as a
Peace Corps local staff member, for fear of the consequences given by higher RPF leaders.59
4.2.2.2.1.2. Refusal to Conduct Trainings
A second example is the refusal by LL A to conduct trainings with the PBs or visit them
at their homes60 unless she controlled the logistics. This non-negotiable request was examined
further during the CIs with the LLs. The question what are your suggestions for the amount of
time spent on the project’s activities? was asked to understand each one’s idea of appropriate
time frames for the TAC’s formal activities,61 as well as to see if the other LLs interviewed had
58

LLs also sometimes requested additional permission from the LL A, the head parishioner of the Catholic Church of Kibuye, and Peace Corps.
Further investigation of small changes during project implementation were not necessary because I already had explained my presence and
intent of the project to LL A and the necessary LLs at KD, BS, and Gitarama, whereupon I received their verbal and written approval after they
reviewed the project’s grant application documents and the permission letter given to each relevant LL.
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His position on the administrative hierarchy required him to consult only with the chief of Kivomo Village first before giving his permission,
but he had to follow the RPF hierarchy since it is more respected than the administrative hierarchy. Furthermore, he had already signed earlier
papers after other leaders did giving his permission to implement the project. When approached again to get permission to conduct the
interviews, the former procedures of document review and interrogation were done again.
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One of the objectives of the club was to have the project beneficiaries transfer learned knowledge, skills, and attitudes (KSA) from TAC by
replicating the microgardens and animal husbandry at their homes. The majority of monitoring and evaluation (M&E) activities would have
taken place at the PBs’ homes via visits and interviews. M&E activities would have evaluated the success and any problems they might have
had setting up their own animal husbandries and microgardens. See Appendix D, Twizere Agriculture Club Project Design (p. 101) for more
information.
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The formal activities of the TAC included trainings, meetings, home visits, and interviews with the PBs. Informal activities included daily care
for the animals and microgardens built by PBs during the trainings.
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the same desire for control as LL A had. Tables 8, 9, and 10 (p. 47) show the suggestions of the
LL RPs for the length of time and frequency that should be devoted to trainings, club meetings,
interviews, and home visits with the PBs.
One notices by comparing and evaluating Tables 8, 9, and 10 that LL A gave the least
practical times for TAC’s formal activities and demanded that they be held only at GPS and only
during times when she could attend.62 The ability to execute trainings during the project
implementation was affected then because LL A was often not available usually due to RPF
district meetings, school administration meetings, and continuing education classes. It is believed
she used her position in the RPF to try to manipulate the organization of trainings in an attempt
to control TAC. She claimed in her CI that the Rwanda’s Ministry of Local Governance
(MINALOC) has a regulation that applies to everyone, everywhere in Rwanda, which states that
community meetings may only take place after the day’s domestic and professional jobs are
finished and each meeting may not go beyond one hour.63
The other two LL RPs, notably LL C, stated that they did not know if any such regulation
existed. In fact, LL C said that the duration and frequency of the TAC’s formal activities
depended on the material to be taught and the organization of the PBs. Additionally, the other
three LLs not interviewed knew that these formal activities would take place and they also did
not state during prior consultations that such a rule existed. The MINALOC regulation may have
been another attempt by LL A to try to govern the logistics of TAC’s formal activities. LL B was
more practical in her responses because she resides in Gitarama and is at GPS more often than
either LL A or LL C; therefore, she knew what were realistic time frames to follow with the PBs.
Yet, because her position at GPS was the lowest on both the administrative and RPF hierarchies
62

TAC was designed to support each group only for six months, so the impracticability of the LL A’s suggestions hindered the ability to cover
all the needed material with each group before the current club members graduated and a new group started.
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When searched for, this regulation could not be confirmed to exist.
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Table 8 Local Leader Research Participant A’s
Suggestions for Length of Time and Frequency of Club Activities

Trainings

Length of Time

Frequency

Total

3 hours per day

1day every 3 months
for the adult project beneficiaries

3 hours every 3 months
for the adult project beneficiaries

1 day monthly for the
child project beneficiaries

3 hours monthly for the
child project beneficiaries

(may be extended to 5 or 6 hours
if food or drink is provided)

Club
Meetings

<1 hour
(after domestic and professional
jobs are finished for the day)

1 day monthly for all project beneficiaries

<1 hour each month
for all project beneficiaries

Interviews

30 minutes

Once per every 3 months for all
project beneficiaries

30 minutes every 3 months for all
project beneficiaries

Home
Visits

< 30 minutes

Once per every 6 months for all
project beneficiaries

<30 minutes every 6 months
for all project beneficiaries

Table 9 Local Leader Research Participant B’s
Suggestions for Length of Time and Frequency of Club Activities
Length of Time

Frequency

Total

Trainings

6 hours per day

Up to 6 days
every 6 months for all project beneficiaries

36 hours every 6 months
for all project beneficiaries

Club
Meetings

2 hours

1 day monthly for all project beneficiaries

Interviews

30 minutes each
Depends on questions or topics
discussed and how receptive each
project beneficiary is to receive a
visit at home

During each home visit

2 hours each month
for all project beneficiaries
30 minutes during each home
visit for all project beneficiaries
1 home visit every six months
for all project beneficiaries

Home
Visits

1 time per every 3 months for all
project beneficiaries

The length of time depends

“If you give the families a per diem, then you can make the trainings longer” (LL B).

Table 10 Local Leader Research Participant C’s
Suggestions for Length of Time and Frequency of Club Activities
Length of Time

Frequency

Total

Trainings

Depends on the organization
of the club and subject matter
being taught

Depends on the organization
of the club and subject matter
being taught

Depends on the organization
of the club and subject matter
being taught

Club
Meetings

↓

↓

↓

Interviews

↓

↓

↓

Home
Visits

↓

↓

↓
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than those of the other two LL RPs, she was not in a position to make decisions or have her
suggestions honored by LL A (whose position is more powerful than LL B and LL C). LL C’s
responses were also realistic; however, her inability to give recommendations of time frames
during her CI hints that she wanted to avoid punishments that come from offering concrete ideas
without first consulting higher RPF authority. This fear also was reflected in her hesitation to be
interviewed alone without the presence of her immediate superior.
The HV Theory X leadership style of the RPF uses intimidation and manipulation to
augment the already-existing collective fear of the nation, allowing tight control to be exercised
over everyone and every function in the country. The RPF head leader, who possibly fears
dominance, uses this tactic on people in high RPF and administrative positions, who then inflict
it onto those of lesser status. Therefore, in general, everyone in Rwanda harbors various degrees
of fear for different reasons. Many people use some form of Theory X leadership (soft or hardversion) to gain or maintain power, as a survival mechanism, or both, regardless of their
hierarchical status. This social interaction causes most Rwandans to hesitate in their decisionmaking, and creates additional negative feelings as the literature review depicts.
This explanation is well illustrated when studying the reactions of the three LL RPs when
being interviewed. They displayed very mixed behaviors, which related to their positions on the
RPF hierarchy.64 LL A displayed confidence, whereas LL B agreed to the interview, but
appeared to panic when answering questions. LL C was reluctant when asked to be interviewed,
insisting on waiting until her boss could be present. She eventually agreed when he continued to
be unavailable for participation.

64

All three LL RPs were well instructed in the purpose of the research and reassured of confidentiality prior to being interviewed; no one
declined.
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4.2.2.2.1.3. Giving the Night Guard Control Over the Project Animals
On more than one occasion, LL A and LL B showed that they, not the PBs, had control
over the TACP. LL A manipulated the APBs in meetings she attended by dominating the
conversation and intimidating them when they tried stating problems and giving opinions, ideas,
and suggestions. LL A and LL B also made the decision to give full control of the animals’ care,
especially during school holidays, to GPS’s night guard, with the reason being, the PBs
neglected them. This decision was made without first consulting the APBs, PCOM, or myself. In
her interview, LL B disclosed, “The PCOM has problems among themselves. There is no
cooperation, so as a solution, the decision was made to hire the guard to take care of the
animals.” An APB (GPS teacher) added, “The club did not organize themselves to care for the
animals, so that is why the guard now has the responsibility. His salary was increased.” By
giving control to the guard, they further kept the PBs from participating in TAC instead of
encouraging the PCOM to collaborate with the other PSs and myself to find a positive solution.
This is a clear example written in the literature review of the opportunity leaders and the elite
have to promote unity, but choose instead to keep people divided.
Seven out of the 23 PBs interviewed (30%) did not agree with LL A and LL B’s decision
to hire the night guard; in fact, many were angry that they were not consulted beforehand. They
believed that he was not a solution to TAC’s problems because of his incompetency and
unreliability to perform this duty properly. “I do not agree with [LL A’s] decision to give
responsibility to the guard. He is taking care of them and they are continuing to die” (APB).
“The guard is not supposed to take care of the animals. He does not know how. On some rabbits,
he used gasoline to cure the infections on their legs and ears because LL A told him. He is not
even competent in his own job as a guard” (two APBs). “The guard does not remove the [soiled]
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grass [from the rabbit hutch]. He is not conscious about sanitation” (CPB). “The guard is busy
with other things. He has no time to do a good job, or maybe he does not care” (APB).
These statements reveal the PBs’ observations of the incapability of the night guard to
care appropriately for the animals. It is not logical that LL A and LL B would hire an
incompetent person to have sole responsibility for the animals when they already were in need of
proper care. Perhaps, though, he was not incompetent, but indifferent to his job because he was
not involved in the TACP. It is also feasible that these LLs chose the night guard because he
already was employed at GPS, and since his salary was under the school’s control, so was he.
This fact made it easier for LL A to control the project’s activities by manipulating him. One
villager is easier to manipulate and command than 15 [beneficiary] families.
4.2.2.2.1.4. Imiganda and Government-Initiated Meetings
In addition to tight controls by LL A, an abundance of government-directed, community
activities caused serious scheduling difficulties in arranging and holding trainings and meetings
with the TAC PBs, despite that 39% of the PBs had conveyed interest and expressed need for
them. Imiganda and other government-directed meetings were a significant constraint that
prevented the PBs from attending the organized TAC meetings.65 On average, 12 out of the 15
APBs (80%) were absent from these organized TAC meetings, and usually their children, as
well. Eight out of the 14 APB RPs interviewed (57%) stated that their absence was frequently
because of mandatory imiganda and government-directed meetings. “I did not attend some club
meetings because there were usually government activities, like umuganda, happening. I had to
prioritize these activities” (APB). “The biggest challenge to the TACP is that there are a lot of
village and grass-roof programs [government-directed, mandatory community programs], so we
could not come to club meetings because we did not have enough time.” (APB).
65

A weekly one-hour TAC meeting typically was organized; the duration of each meeting depended on the available time of the PBs.
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These obligatory imiganda and other government-directed meetings, which control the
subordinates’ free time, are another way the government dominates the population, instead of
creating cooperation and partnership by encouraging volunteerism in the community.
Spontaneously planned, they leave little extra time to independently progress outside government
or NGO-controlled assistance. Instead, precious time is spent attending to immediate needs.
“There are a lot of last-minute government meetings. Every Tuesday we have our local [celllevel] umuganda, plus the countrywide umuganda the last Saturday of every month. There are
consequences if you miss a government meeting. Everyone must attend, regardless, so time is
short for other programs, like the club” (APB).
The PBs hinted in their responses to the CQ 1 that they are intimidated into attending the
government-directed activities. Paying a fine is the typical consequence if absent; however, some
locals have commented that jail time or beatings are also punishments. Some locals who want to
avoid punishment are forced to prioritize these activities, consistently giving government leaders
opportunities to manage their subordinates. Furthermore, oftentimes the locals are required to
pay fees at these meetings. This is detrimental to the poorest people, since money is precious and
hard to obtain. One PB reported, “We were supposed to give money [to buy chicken food], but
we cannot because we need to give money for other things during imiganda and government
meetings” (APB). A site visit to GPS showed an old man, who had been undoubtedly intimidated
by LLs, calling fellow villagers to attend a government meeting. He railed against his peers,
insulting them, and forewarning of consequences if they did not come. He said (roughly
translated), “It is wonderful to have leaders like ours. They need us present at the meeting. You
will be seriously punished if you do not come, no matter what your reasons are.”
The PBs emphasized that their free time to complete jobs and other activities, such as
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coming to TAC meetings or taking care of the project animals, is difficult if not impossible, due
to the overload of these mandatory events. “Teamwork is a problem because… we cannot find
time to be together… everyone is busy… It is hard to manage our time around [government
meetings]…to organize ourselves to let [the chickens] be free…[so]…everyone ignores their
responsibilities” (two APBs who are teachers at GPS).
The locals are intimidated and manipulated by fearful and lengthy day-long meetings,
which steal what little personal free time the recipients could enjoy. One observation in Gitarama
supports this description of a typical government meeting. LLs had organized groups of villagers
to sit on the ground and listen as an apparent LL stood above and bullied them with authority.
The LL used threatening words and gestures that indicated punishment. Another observation
took place at the Gitarama Cell administrative office while discussing the TACP with a LL of
high power in Gitarama. A RPF soldier from the military camp in Kibuye arrived and examined
me about my presence and intentions in Gitarama. This same soldier later led a government
meeting with the villagers, using the same threatening words and bullying gestures observed
during the previous visit. This tactic of intimidation and manipulation leaves the citizenry
dependent on the government and guarantees unconditional compliance, acceptance, and
(superficial) devotion to their totalitarian leader, which in return, gives them easier control over
the locals’ lives. These examples are almost certainly an indication of SS in locals in a TES
(living under a totalitarian regime) and reflect well the studies in the literature review of
totalitarian leaders and their dependents’ behaviors in conflict and post-conflict states.
4.2.2.3. Corruption of the Local Leader Project Stakeholders
Based on the corruption theories in the literature, one can hypothesize that at the national
and local levels, there are some authorities/leaders engaging in corruptive acts because of the

52

availability of large amounts of foreign aid money being invested in Rwanda’s post-genocide
reconstruction and development. Two notable corruptive acts by LL PSs occurred in the TACP
and contributed to the significant constraint of the animals’ poor health and deaths. These acts
were the inferior construction of the rabbit hutch and the improper identification of the PBs.
4.2.2.3.1. The Construction of the Rabbit Hutch
The budgeted money for the rabbit hutch construction was given to LL A to obtain the
necessary materials, which included wooden planks, tin sheets for the sides and roof, poles to
hold up the hutch, and strong, small-holed, wire mesh screen for the floor of the hutch. LL A
acquired the materials, and built the rabbit hutch without involving the PBs. It was obvious her
actions were deceptive upon seeing the constructed rabbit hutch. The roof and sides were old
clay tiles and pieces of discarded tin that had lain around the school grounds. Sticks that had
been the walls of the kindergarten classroom had been torn down and re-used as the poles to hold
the hutch off the ground. The floor of the hutch was weak, wide-holed, wire mesh screen. The
insides of the individual rooms were not well-sealed and nails protruded from the wood. The
benches in front of the hutch that served as a step for the children to access the hutch were not
well-secured, and soon broke after their construction.66 The receipts for the materials returned by
LL A did not reflect the actual materials used, showing she neglected to purchase the budgeted
supplies.
Sixteen out of the 26 PSs (62%) reported in their CIs that they had observed problems
with the construction of the rabbit hutch. LL A, who oversaw the construction, was among these
sixteen people. More specifically, 10 out of the 16 people remarked that the rabbit hutch was not
sealed well inside and six out of these 16 commented that the mesh screen on the bottom of the
66

The benches were added so that children could access the rabbits without having to put the rabbit hutch so low to the ground that other animals
could harm them. The PCOM and LL A neglected to have the benches and the protruding nails inside the hutch repaired, after being
approached by me many times about these problems.
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hutch was not strong and the size was too big. They said that the bunnies were falling through
the mesh screen and the rabbits, especially the males, were easily passing between the rooms and
injuring each other (the pregnant females were especially harmed).
Nine out of the 16 interviewees referred to poor construction as the cause of death of
some adult rabbits and most of the bunnies. “The screen on the bottom is not strong. The holes
are too big and in many areas the screen broke. The bunnies fall onto the ground and die. The
screen should be replaced with strong, smaller-holed screen” (APB). “Short people and children
cannot see inside because the benches were not fixed well and they broke” (CPB). Others
contributed the rabbits’ deaths to wind exposure, malnutrition, and poor sanitation caused by
improper care by both the PBs and the night guard. “The inside of the rabbit hutch is not well
protected from the wind and the bunnies are getting cold and dying” (APB). “The children
stopped giving grass to the rabbits because they could not reach into the hutch” (APB). “The
workers were supposed to put cement on the ground so bugs and other animals could not get
inside and disturb the rabbits” (APB).67
The construction of the chicken coop was monitored more closely after the poor job on
the rabbit hutch. As mentioned earlier, building the chicken coop became a community project
when TAC PBs joined with another youth club and other Gitarama community members to lay
the foundation and build the skeleton structure. Hired, trained local workers demonstrated and
led the construction.68 The chicken coop served as a model for how a suitable animal pen should
look69 and as a result, no chickens died due to inferior construction. In fact, 19 out of the 26 PS

67

GPS was supposed to provide cement as part of the community’s contribution to the TACP’s budget. See Table 3 under Appendix D, Twizere
Agriculture Club Project Design for the budget (p. 108).

68

The chicken coop took three days to build. The hired workers finished the construction alone after government meetings prevented the PBs and
community members from returning after the first day.

69

There is no fixed way to build a rabbit hutch or chicken coop. Locating enough good quality materials may pose a challenge since the people
in Gitarama are poor and the Rwandan government has a law that forbids cutting trees without prior permission. The TACP budgeted for
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RPs (73%) responded that the chicken coop was built well and that the only problems were its
constant unsanitary conditions and destruction by locals of the lock, door, and outside fence.
Two CPB interviewees remarked, “There are no problems with the chicken coop but children are
destroying the lock, door, and fence. We are supposed to clean the coop because it is dirty.” “[It]
is well built. The sides are ventilated and cool the chickens when it is hot; they are well
protected” (APB).The remaining seven people (27%) suggested that it should have been built
bigger to house the large number of chickens and give more space for laying.70
Participatory planning of the chicken coop with the PBs involved determining the local
prices of materials and who would obtain local items (e.g. logs) for reimbursement while I
oversaw the purchase of the rest things in Kibuye.71 A minor attempt at corruption by the PBs
did occur during such a meeting. It was discovered that the quoted prices of the materials were
inflated, being much higher than those in Kibuye town. One leader in the PCOM said during this
particular meeting (thinking I could not understand her), “Let’s devour this foreigner’s money”
(roughly translated). This example shows how even locals with a little authority may attempt
exploitation for money when given the chance, instead of honest work. It also supports Le
Billon’s argument that ordinary citizens will do corruption to survive in a highly corrupt state.
4.2.2.3.2. Identification of the Project Beneficiaries
The second corruptive act by LLs had the most significant impact on the project as a
whole, besides the exorbitant number of mandatory government-directed activities. This act was
the faulty identification of the PBs and it helped generate, along with the other factors already

enough solid materials to build safe animal housing to use as a demonstration for the community. Alternative building methods the PBs could
use at their homes were supposed to be discussed during the trainings (ibid).
70

The chicken coop was built 4m2x2m2, making it 3x bigger than what is theoretically needed to house 15 egg-laying chickens, under the
assumption that they would be closed up only at night and during bad weather. More space was given to accommodate extra future chickens.

71

The purpose of collectively gathering the materials was to promote partnership, collaboration, and a sense of ownership over the project, while
at the same time, monitor the purchase of materials to prevent possible stealing of the project’s money.
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discussed, many of the TACP’s constraints. GPS personnel chose the first group of PBs
supposedly using the IC;72 however, observations and casual conversations with the chosen PBs,
LLs, and Gitarama community members sparked suspicion that the project’s IC had not been
followed. Four noteworthy observations led to the assumption that the identification was
corrupted. These were: (a) The chosen PBs had at least one animal and many owned a cow or
several goats (b) one CPB was in sixth grade at the time of identification (c) the majority of the
chosen PBs lived next to the school (d) the chosen PBs had personal and/or professional
relationships with the those in charge of the identification and/or were influential in Gitarama.
Which animals the TACP should buy was discussed during an initial meeting; it was
agreed that chickens and rabbits be purchased over cows or goats.73 One leader of the PCOM
showed extreme dissatisfaction with this decision and insisted that either cows or goats be
purchased instead,74 as did a few other APBs in the CI: “The project gave me only a
chicken…You need to give us something more, like a goat or something that has four legs.”
“They [the other beneficiaries] were saying that rabbits and chickens were nothing significant.”75
These reactions exhibited that some of the PBs already owned animals,76 as well as DS, from
their insistence that the TACP supply expensive animals and display of annoyance when
explained to that it would not be feasible to do so.
The CIs revealed that one CB had left GPS to attend secondary school; thus, she was
already in grade six when the identification had taken place. Choosing her went against another
72

See Table 1 under Appendix D, Twizere Agriculture Club Project Design, Twizere Agriculture Club Project Description for the IC (p. 102).

73

Chickens and rabbits are more advantageous than goats or cows for a poor community like Gitarama because they are cheaper to buy, easier to
raise (especially for children), reproduce often, and provide a surplus of products to eat or sell.

74

His request was overruled because there lacked sufficient money and time to purchase and raise enough cows or goats for each six-month
cycle of the project to make the TACP sustainable.

75

Cows play an important role in Rwandan culture and are perhaps the only animal really valued by most Rwandans. A cow is a sign of wealth
because of its historic symbol and because it is expensive to buy and keep.

76

It was observed later that one leader of the PCOM lives next to GPS and owns four cows, three goats, and several chickens. Possessing one or
more animals went against the first identification criterion.
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identification criterion.77 Additionally, the results of the WIs, verified that all 15 children (out of
487 GPS students) in the first group had been chosen only from the village closest to GPS rather
than amongst all eight villages in Gitarama. This act neglected seven whole villages and
narrowed the diversity from which to select. The skepticism that the first group of PBs had either
a familial or professional relationship with those who identified them was confirmed while
interviewing the PSs and through my own observations and analysis. Fourteen APBs (43%) were
either the child or sibling of a teacher at GPS and eight child beneficiaries (57%) had
parents/guardians who were influential in the society. Likewise, one child from the eight had
another resource of financial help outside the TACP from a project called COMPASSION.78
These observations supported the findings.
The conjecture that the first group was improperly identified was proven through the CIs
and WIs and my observations before and during these interviews. Corruption in the identification
was verified: the PBs of the first group were not the poorest and most vulnerable in the region
and thus, should not have been targeted first. Two statements support this confirmation. LL C
said in her CI, “Locals who already have a lot of animals should not have been given more
because they already have a lot of responsibilities.” One APB shared that another declared she
did not need the project. “She said she was going to leave the project because she was able to
buy chickens and rabbits herself.”
The results of the WIs revealed that the Gr1 PB’s wealth category consisted of seven
well-to-do (50%), six better off (43%), and one poor (7%).79 All of the families, with the

77

Secondary schools in Rwanda are boarding schools; children attend them upon completing grade five of primary school and passing the
national examinations. The reason the project was not supposed to choose current sixth graders was because they would have left for
secondary school soon after TAC started and would not have been present to participate in the club activities or to assist their peers in future
TAC groups.

78

See Appendix F, Figures 18 and 19 (pp. 117 & 118).

79

It is assumed that the PB family who moved from Gitarama had a wealth category of well-to-do or better off as they had resources to move.
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exception of a GPS teacher, owned at least one goat, cow, or sheep, averaging three animals per
family. At least one person was employed in six out of the 14 families (43%), and nine of the 14
families (65%) ate two or three meals per day; the average being 1.8 meals a day per family.
Nine out of 12 families whose assets were revealed received a grade of A or B. On the contrary,
the findings of Gr2 PB’s wealth category consisted of all destitute. Not one family interviewed
(0%) possessed an animal, nor did any family (0%) have steady employment. Furthermore, all 15
families reported typically eating no meals a day.80 Thirteen out of the 15 families whose assets
were made known received a grade of F (see Tables 11 and 12, pp. 59 & 60).81 Based on the
conversations, many families were at-risk in this group.82
The analysis behind this dishonest identification stems from corruption by GPS personnel
who were in charge of PB selection. They chose people with whom they had either familial,
friend, or professional relationships, possibly hoping they could profit later from those who were
chosen. This analysis is supported by two examples from the literature review: Ware and
Noone’s explanation that political leaders in higher positions on the hierarchy tactically assign
jobs, contracts, loans, and grants to certain elite groups who are then manipulated for the leaders’
personal gain, and Kumar and Corbridge’s analysis of their community development agriculture
project in India. The findings of the CIs and WIs, as well as the supporting observations,
concluded that every PB family chosen for Gr1 had more stable means of living than presumably
the majority of Gitarama’s population who are more at-risk for food insecurity, malnutrition, and
overall poor quality of livelihood. Therefore, the families in this group they should not have been

80

Conversations and observations revealed that the average Gitarama local eats a diet of plantains, sweet potatoes, white potatoes, beans, and
wild spinach-like leaves as staple foods.

81

Key for Tables 11 & 12 is on p. 61.

82

The Gr2 PB families suffered from extreme poverty, severe malnutrition, and HIV/AIDS. Some were from the Twa tribe, who are more
marginalized in Rwanda than the poorest of the poor. Others were women whose husbands left to search for new wives or whose children were
sent away to live elsewhere because of poverty.
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Table 11

Wealth Index Survey Results for Group 1 Beneficiary Families

Group 1
Beneficiary
Families

Livestock

Employment
in the
Family

Number
of Meals
per Day

A

1 Goat

No

1

2 Cows
2 Chickens

Yes

3

B

C

1 Goat

No

D

2 Goats
2 Cows

No

2

E

1 Cow

No

1

1 Cow

No

1

G

3 Sheep

No

2

I

J

K

1 Goat

Yes

4 Cows
3 Goats
3 Chickens

Yes

2 Cows

Yes

1 Cow
2 Goats
2 Chickens

No

OL
SBH
AA (“C”)
OL
SBH
SU
AA (“A”)
OL
SBH
SU
AA (“B”)

1-2

F

H

Other Assets

OL
SBH
SU
AA (“A”)
OL
SBH
SU
AA (“A”)
OL
AA (“D”)
OL
SBH
SU
AA (“C”)
OL
SBH
SU
AA (“A”)
OL
SBH
SU
AA (“A”)
OL
SBH
SU
AA (“A”)
OL
SBH
SU
AA (“A”)

2

2

3

2

L

1 Goat
1 Chicken

Yes

1

OL
SU

M

No

Yes

2

OL
SU

N

2 Cows
3 Chickens

No

1

OL
SBH
SU
AA (“B”)
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Exceptional Observations
(seen or told)

Wealth
Category

N/A

Better off

 Sometimes the family
can afford to eat meat

Well-to-do

N/A

Better off

 Interviewee’s husband used to
work at Gitarama Cell office
before falling ill
 RPF pays secondary school fees
for their two oldest children

Well-to-do

N/A

Better off

N/A

Poor

N/A

Better off

N/A

Well-to-do

N/A

Well-to-do

N/A

Well-to-do

 Interviewee is the president of
teachers at GPS and the
president of the PCOM
 Beneficiary was interviewed at
GPS; therefore it is unknown
what her house looks like and
what her additional assets are
 Interviewee is a teacher at GPS
 Beneficiary was interviewed at
GPS; therefore it is unknown
what his house looks like and
what his additional assets are
 Interviewee is a teacher at GPS
N/A

Well-to-do

Better off

Better off

Well-to-do

Table 12

Wealth Index Survey Results for Group 2 Beneficiary Families

Group 2
Beneficiary
Families

Livestock

Employment
in the
Family

Number
of Meals
per Day

A

No

No

B

No

C

Wealth
Category

Other Assets

Exceptional Observations
(seen or told)

0-1

OL
AA (“F”)

No

0-1

AA (“F”)

No

No

0-1

AA (“F”)

D

No

No

0-1

OL
AA (“F”)

E

No

No

0-1

AA (“F”)

F

No

No

0-1

OL

G

No

No

0-1

AA (“F”)

 Interviewee’s child appeared
malnourished and stunted
 Family does not have basic
health insurance (<$2 USD/
person/year)
 Interviewee (widowed woman)
takes care of seven children in
the family
 The children in this family
appear to be severely
malnourished
 10 people live in the house built
for possibly 5 people at the
most
 House is literally in ruins
 Family was not home at the
time of visit; therefore, it is
unknown what kind of assets
they have
 Neighbor gave us the
information; she told us one
child left school because of no
money and hunger
 House is rented
 Children appear severely
malnourished

H

No

No

0-1

I

No

No

0-1

J

No

No

0-1

OL
AA (“F”)
OL
GSFH
AA (“C”)
OL
AA (“F”)

K

No

No

0-1

AA (“F”)

N/A

Destitute

L

No

No

0-1

No

No

0-1

N/A
Children appear severely
malnourished
Children appear severely
malnourished
Interviewee’s husband kicked
her and the children out of the
house because of poverty; she
was living with her mother at
the time of the interview
Children appear severely
malnourished
Interviewee stated his wife is
mentally sick

Destitute

M

AA (“F”)
OL
AA (“F”)


N

No

No

0-1

AA (“F”)




O

No

No

0-1

AA (“F”)
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Destitute

Destitute

Destitute

Destitute

Destitute

Destitute

N/A

Destitute

N/A

Destitute

 Interviewee is HIV+ and her
husband is in jail



Destitute

Destitute

Destitute

Destitute

Destitute

Key for Tables 11 & 1283
Other Assets: OL (own land), SBH (solidly built house), SU (child owns a school uniform), AA (additional assets)
Note: AA includes possessing the following four groups of assets: (a) kitchen/cultivating tools (b) furniture (c) at least one bed
(d) at least one mattress. AA for each family is graded based on the following scale: “A” = owns assets from all four groups,
“B” = owns assets from three out of the four groups, “C” = owns assets from two out of the four groups, “D” = owns assets from one
of out the four groups, “F” = owns no additional assets
Note: GPS = Gitarama Primary School, PCOM = Parent Committee, RPF = Rwandan Patriotic Front

Well-to-do

Better off

Poor

Destitute

 Owns > 1 cow or >
2 animals other than
a cow

 Has > 1 animal other
than a cow

 May have > 1 chicken

 Possesses no animals

 At least one person
is employed in the
home

 No employment in
the home

 No employment in
the home

 No employment in
the home

 Eats > 2 meals a day

 Eats > 1 meals a day

 Eats 1 meal a day

 Eats 0-1 meal a day

 Possesses all 3
groups of assets:
OL, SBH, SU

 Possesses > 2 out of the
3 groups of assets: OL,
SBH, SU

 Owns land, possesses no
other groups of assets

 Owns no groups of assets

 AA are graded > B

 AA are graded > C

 AA are graded > D

 AA are graded “F”

chosen as the PBs for the TACP’s first six-month cycle. 84 85

4.2.3 Trauma and Rwanda’s Post-conflict Culture
It is likely that totalitarian-HV Theory X leadership and corruption were largely
responsible for about half of the identified TACP constraints, while the other half related
83

Tables 11 and 12 were adapted from Project Design Handbook. Copyright 2002. Cooperative for Assistance and Relief Everywhere, Inc. Used
by permission.

84

Research to look at the wealth index of every family in Gitarama was not done.

85

The aim of identification was to target the poorest families first in Gitarama and then the “wealthier” families who had less need for immediate
help. Furthermore, the poorest families may have had more time to devote to the project because they had no regular employment or farm
work. The TACP could have been their one stable livelihood. The PBs chosen first did indeed deserve a place in TAC; however, Gr1 PBs were
not the poorest of the poor in Gitarama, as shown by the results of the WIS. Since they did not meet the IC, they would have been chosen later
because the TACP was designed to “graduate” and rotate club members every six months. Eventually all the children at GPS would have had
the opportunity to participate in TAC through this rotation.
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significantly to chronic trauma experienced by so many citizens—the result of conflict in
Rwanda. The civil war with the genocide86 escalated the historical tension between the Tutsi and
Hutu, and the present-day regime is destroying what little peace was left in the already fragile
relationships among the people. The research indicated six specific consequences of trauma in
TAC that affected the PSs and the club’s functioning: (a) PTSS in the APBs (b) division among
TAC members (c) behavioral change from a collectivist culture to an individualist culture (d)
appeasement (e) Stockholm syndrome (f) dependency syndrome.
4.2.3.1. Post-traumatic Stress Symptoms in the Adult Project Beneficiaries
The very nature of genocide attests that people who experienced and survived it
presumably have some degree of trauma, in the form of PTSS or other psychopathological
disorders, including CPTSD. Being a nation-wide holocaust, it is credible that everyone in
Rwanda during the genocide was exposed to at least one of the eight dimensions of trauma,
including TAC’s PSs, as well as other Gitarama community members.87 It is also plausible that
the negative effects of trauma are contributing to the poverty from which Rwandans already
suffer. For example, one boy whose father was interviewed in the Gr2 PBs said his mother had
been mentally ill “for a long time” and could not work. Based on the results of their WIS, this
family eats 0-1 times a day, has no animals or other means of livelihood, and lives in a
precariously built house.
The literature review alludes to studies that proved victims of traumatic events during
World War II continued to show signs of trauma 45 years later, and several years after the Gulf
War. These studies support the fact that people can indeed still be severely traumatized only 16
years after the genocide—and especially as another dictator is in power. Rwandans suffering
86

See the timeline under Appendix B, Significant Events in Rwandan History (p. 94).

87

It is assumed that the people living in Gitarama today experienced the genocide since their economic state would have prevented them from
escaping it by fleeing abroad.
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from PTSS are caught in a vicious cycle where PTSS affect and are affected by other PTSS. The
seven most common PTSS noticed in Gr1 APBs and Gr2 APBs were (a) emotional distress (b)
intense panic (c) hopelessness (d) helplessness (e) negativity (f) powerlessness (g) vulnerability.
In total, seven out of the 23 PBs (30%) distinctly showed these PTSS by their statements in the
CIs. However, all the PTSS in adults and those in children found in the literature review can be
recognized in other Rwandans when sufficient time is spent with them.
The most common PTSS in Rwanda upon observing locals may be emotional distress.
Numerous times, I witnessed locals cringing or flinching when approached suddenly, or pointing
and laughing even when someone was in serious trouble. This lack of empathy shown by most
Rwandans illustrates the emotional distress and probable complex trauma (CPTSD), which also
is exhibited in their lack of ability to concentrate. One APB confirmed this by saying, “To work
with Rwandans, you have to repeat yourself several times for them to comprehend.” These
examples are common symptoms of CPTSD, as described in the literature review. Similarly,
statements of “Do not record me,” and, “Do not tell the others what I am going to tell you,”
emphasized by the APBs, even after reassuring confidentiality and establishing an atmosphere
of ease, displayed acute emotional stress, intense panic, fear, and mistrust.
It appeared that bouts of hopelessness associated with trauma might have brought on the
PTSS of helplessness in Gr1 and Gr2 APBs. Helplessness probably led to negativity and feelings
of powerlessness due to their circumstances. Evidence of these PTSS came out in statements
during the interviews with both groups: “We have nothing. Nothing to eat, nothing”
(hopelessness); “When they [PBs] do not see you [myself] coming [to Gitarama], they stop to do
anything and neglect the club”(helplessness); “People are stubborn and fighting among
themselves” (negativity); and “I’m discouraged because people [in the club] are divided...There
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are parents who really need this project, but our [local] leaders discouraged us instead of helping
us improve” (powerlessness).
Combined with other stressful life situations such as poverty, the PTSS of vulnerability
can occur in post-traumatic victims. Widows and women with absentee husbands are one
example of a social group in Gitarama who may be suffering from this PTSS, as well as PTSD.
Twelve out of the 14 APBs interviewed (86%) were women; eight out of these 12 (67%) were
either widowed or their husbands were in jail.88 One PB widow explained, “Most women in
Gitarama do not have husbands at home. If he did not die, he is in jail.” Additionally, three
women from Gr2 PBs shared that their husbands had left home because of poverty to look for
other wives in Kibuye. Trauma and poverty may have increased already unbearable feelings of
hopelessness and may have guided their (husbands’) decision to leave.
The study by Pham et al., described in the literature review, proved that two-thirds of
post-traumatic victims with PTSD symptoms in Rwanda are women, and that they are more
subject to abuse and poverty, especially in a traditional society where they do not have equality
with men. It is conceivable that the majority of the women in the TACP may be suffering from
PTSD or PTSS since 67% of them lost their husbands and are running their households alone,
oftentimes caring for orphans in addition to their own children. “I take care of three children.
One child is an orphan. Their [sic] father is gone,” one APB explained. Another woman PB
clarified in her CI that most families have personal problems and domestic tasks are abundant
and overwhelming. Her remark suggests that their problems make them feel hopeless. She
advised, “People are discouraged. They do not meet often because of personal problems at their
homes…The problems in people’s families need to be solved first to fix problems in the club.”
Four other interviewees (19% of the total research the PS RP group) gave similar statements
88

See Appendix F, Figure 20 (p. 119).
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supporting her claim. Thus, hopelessness most likely was a huge contributor to the common
problems of absence and indifference to TAC activities.
PTSS of fear and intense panic also may be embedded in the LLs who are working within
the RPF hierarchy under a totalitarian regime. These PTSS may be another explanation of why
the LLs displayed hesitation and questioned each action of the TACP implementation process
when requesting permission.
4.2.3.2. Division Among the Twizere Agriculture Club Project Beneficiaries
Rwanda’s complicated history, lack of mental health counseling services, and HV Theory
X, totalitarian leadership make it difficult for PTG and sustainable reconciliation to take place.
Everyday interactions with the locals reflect the repercussions of trauma on the Rwandan society.
Working on the TACP shed light on the division among people in the community of Gitarama
from unaddressed collective trauma.89 When analyzing the data, 12 out of 26 PS interviewed
(46%) showed fear, anger, mistrust, or combinations of the three in their responses to the CIQs.
The APBs’ great concerns for their CQ 1 responses to be kept secret from the other PSs
manifests the probable fright and suspicion Rwandans have of each other possibly due to postconflict trauma. “The best way to fix the [club’s] problems…bring everyone together so we can
feel comfortable among ourselves. But be careful how you discuss the club’s problems with
everyone…so it does not cause further anger and division,” prompted one APB.
Thirty-five per cent of PSs interviewed stated that the PBs are divided, which resulted in
no cooperation or communication among themselves, apathy to the TACP, and poor health of

89

Possible trauma from genocide survivors may be affecting their outlook on community cohesiveness. The change in their outlook, along with
the transfer of PTSS to their children, could be influencing their children’s perception of their community, as shown in transgenerational
trauma studies, post-conflict collective trauma studies, and the ABC-X Model of Family Stress.
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TAC’s animals. Their fear and mistrust caused fighting and anger90 with each other, and induced
their divided relationships as fellow club members. “The club members are divided. We do not
work together and some do not value the club…If we had worked together, the club would not
have any problems” (APB).
Besides division, 38% of PSs interviewed mentioned indifference and diffuse of
responsibility (the by-stander effect) as two additional causes behind the PBs’ abandonment of
TAC. More specifically, 23% of PSs expressed there was division among PCOM members, and
35% of PSs said the PCOM lacked organization and communication with other PBs, who also
contributed to their resignation from TAC. “The PCOM was fighting with each other and having
problems. “People are pointing fingers at each other and do not want to take responsibility to
work for the club;” Organization by the PCOM was bad…it ceased to exist…so the rest of the
PBs stopped caring [about TAC];” “The club members were not too motivated to give the
animals food or release them to scavenge” (three APBs). The indifference shown by the PBs
reflects collective trauma and the ways by which subordinates respond to overcontrolling leaders
as presented by Bolman and Deal in the literature review. Furthermore, it displays probable
discouragement of some PBs from receiving no help from the others.
Some comments by PCOM members insinuated that LL A and LL B were not supportive
of the PBs as school leaders and future supervisors of the TACP. Instead, when PCOM members
approached them for help with the problems of division between PBs, the leaders ignored their
pleas. “All of the problems [in TAC] were told to the school leaders and teachers and they did
not do anything to help us” (PCOM member). Again, this shows the likely desire of leaders to
keep their subordinates divided and fearful or angry with each other in order to retain control, as
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It is also important to mention that anger and resentment were also shown when some of the PBs spoke about the many imiganda and
government meetings. Their anger communicated that their constant, required attendance at these affairs was not something with which they
agreed, but something of which they had no choice but comply.
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mentioned by Staub in the literature review.
4.2.3.3. Behavioral Change from a Collectivist Culture
to an Individualist Culture
It was noticeable in TAC that the PSs’ desire to work individually rather than collectively
encouraged their efforts to care for the TAC animals. The circumstances under which they live—
post-conflict trauma, fear and mistrust of other Rwandans, and a ruling totalitarian regime—have
caused huge changes to a country that traditionally lived as a unified society.91 Rwanda’s
tremulous past and resulting post-conflict dynamics have turned the culture that was oncecollectivist into one that is distinctly individualist. Trauma and the deterrent of HV Theory X
leadership are preventing consolidation of Rwandan communities.
The indifference of the PBs to collaborate in properly caring for TAC’s animals shows
their inability to work together for the common good, instead, working to meet their immediate
needs.92 Thirteen PBs (57%) mentioned the animals’ health suffered at GPS because of
dissention, feuds, indifference, time limitations, and the incompetence and/or indifference of
GPS’s night guard. “Keeping them at the school is hard. The animals are sick because not
everyone is taking responsibility to care for them” (CPB). As a result, the main problems of the
project chickens were 0% egg production and 21% mortality rate. Issues considered unsolvable
to the PSs were a contagious disease (sleeping sickness),93 unsanitary conditions, malnutrition
from insufficient food, and no funds to purchase feed. The majority of the PSs contributed these
issues to the problems with the chickens.
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Even though the Hutu and Tutsi tribes fought and were divided since the arrival of the Belgians, people of the same ethnic tribe worked
together. Other Rwandans outside the TACP and Gitarama have verbalized that the genocide has caused mistrust among themselves, even
those from the same tribe.
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The literature review explains some differences between collectivist and individualist societies. One characteristic of collectivist cultures is
concern for the collective group. However, Rwandans have learned to work individually to meet basic needs (as depicted in studies of postconflict Cambodia and Sri Lanka) because of their collective trauma (as described in the study of post-genocide Bosnia).
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“The school leaders said the chickens died of sleeping sickness, but if that were the cause, all of the chickens would have been contaminated
and died quickly. But they did not; only three died” (APB).
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A leader in the PCOM, LL A, and LL B insisted that the PBs take the chickens home.94
This eventually was done after everyone stopped coming to GPS to care for them. “The school

leaders gave us each a project chicken to take home and feed well so they would not have more
problems. We were not able to care for them together at the school” (CPB). The leaders of GPS
and the PCOM were in powerful positions, according to Rwandans’ view of societal hierarchy,
to support cohesiveness and cooperation between the PBs. The leaders of GPS’ outlook on the
ability of the PBs (their subordinates) to cooperate in caring for the animals can be compared to
the “self-fulfilling prophecy” of HV Theory X leadership used by most Rwandans in power.
Ineffective leadership and DS may have also added to their indifference in encouraging
teamwork among the PBs.
The rumor of a contagious disease was refuted when all the chickens’ health dramatically
improved and they began laying eggs soon after the PBs began caring for them at home.95 Sixty
two percent of the PSs interviewed realized that the chicken’s illness and lack of laying eggs was
because they were hungry, not having been released to scavenge. “The chickens were not laying
eggs because they were hungry. Now we have many eggs because they are free to scavenge for
food” (APB). However, a few people emphasized that they knew chickens would lay eggs with
enough food.
The improvement of the chickens’ health proved the competence and capability of the
PBs to care for the chickens96 (and most likely the rabbits), as well as their unwillingness to
cooperate in doing so. “The president [of the PCOM] suggested the idea to take the chickens
94

The request was previously denied by myself and other PBs. The chickens were supposed to serve as a model for the Gitarama community and
if they were taken home before reproducing sufficiently, there would have been no more replacements for the next groups. Moreover, once the
chickens were taken, it would have been very unlikely that the PBs would have returned them or any chicks because of the divided and
individualistic nature of present-day Rwandan relationships. The concern was that if no chickens were returned, there would have been no
more to keep TAC sustainable.
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Observations during the CIs showed all TACP chickens given to the PB families were released to scavenge and appeared to be much healthier.

96

Observations and informal conversations revealed that most rural Rwandans already raise the local breed of chickens bought for TAC.
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home. He had already built his chicken coop at his house. He became angry when the other club
members refused his idea” (APB). “Those chickens can stay at our homes instead of at the
school. When they have babies, we can give them to other club groups” (CPB). PSs expressed
statements 19 times in the CIs that refer to the PBs’ desire to work individually instead of as a
team. Their insistence to take the project animals before enough had been produced to keep the
project sustainable, shows a change in the collectivist characteristics of the culture, and may be a
sign of possible collective trauma.
4.2.3.4. Appeasement
Appeasement typically is used under extreme authoritarian/totalitarian environments as a
survival mechanism, and has become a living style for Rwandans because of intense fear and
trauma. Locals appease RPF by prioritizing imiganda and government-directed meetings to avoid
punishment (active avoidance). The consequence of this appeasement is that Rwandans stay
divided and do not live in real peace. Anyone perceived as having any kind of authority,
including foreigners and development workers, are shown this appeasement. This results in fear
and mistrust that prevent locals from seeking these individuals’ assistance with problems.
Six APBs shared statements, such as “There are no problems in the project. There is no
fighting or gossiping,” “The problems with the rabbits and chickens are no one’s fault,” and
“There were problems, but now they are fixed,” in their interviews that signal their reluctance to
say anything else except, “all is well”. Fourteen out of 23 PBs interviewed (61%) had noticed
problems with the rabbit hutch, but not one person approached a LL, GPS leader, or myself
(passive avoidance). Instead, they tried in vain to improve it by periodically placing grass and
banana leaves over the holes in the hutch. They finally communicated their concerns with its
condition privately during their CIs.
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Other articulated expressions of pacification toward the TACP appeared 14 times in the
CIs. The PSs displayed apparent appeasement to me during beginning TAC meetings, notably
the first one. Every PB attended and agreed on which animals to purchase for TAC during this
meeting. The PSs (except for one leader of the PCOM)97 all concurred that rabbits and chickens
were the best choice. The issue that Seventh Day Adventists do not raise or eat rabbits came up
later in only one CI when an APB confirmed the religious denomination has this rule, but that it
is not strictly followed in very poor areas where the availability of food is limited.
The Seventh Day Adventist denomination is popular in BS and still no LL or other
community member explained the restriction before or during the TACP design phase. The fact
that no one mentioned this rule until the CIs (and by only one APB) is an example of pacification
by both the PBs and LLs. Perhaps this appeasement was displayed from fear of the LLs (passive
avoidance) who endorsed the TACP, and/or from fear of being removed from the TACP by me
(active avoidance).98 The LLs probably were appeasing me at first because I was foreign by
convincing me of their support towards the TACP while profiting from it simultaneously by any
possible means. They also most likely wanted to demonstrate their loyalty to the RPF by
promoting a project from one of the GOR’s development partners.
4.2.3.5. Stockholm Syndrome
Pertaining to the experiences with the TACP, the behavior of LL A is the clearest
example of someone who appears to display SS, resulting from the traumatic experiences
associated with Rwanda’s genocide and civil war. It is assumed that in Rwanda, innocent
civilians were abused and killed during the civil war and genocide by all involved. LL A made it
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Refer back to the poor identification of the PBs—section 4.2.2.3.2. Identification of the Project Beneficiaries.

98

This appeasement may be a result of intimidation from leaders, plus dependency syndrome, as illustrated by Fearon et al. in the literature
review regarding pleasing outside funders in a project in post-conflict Liberia.
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known that she was in Rwanda during these events, and so, most certainly suffered one or more
of the eight dimensions of trauma. The RPF was part of the horrific events that still affect
millions of people. It is now in power and governs with a totalitarian-HV Theory X leadership
style, putting most of the citizenry in a TES. Hence, the party is an “attacker” in the SS theory.
The role the party played in the two conflicts and their ruling methods explain why many
survivors may have developed SS and go to extremes to appease government leaders99 even if it
means giving contradicting thoughts, orders, and actions.
The political and administrative positions of the LL A ratified her control over the
logistics of TAC trainings. As discussed earlier, she used an unconfirmed, national law as an
excuse to schedule TAC meetings infrequently and short in duration. She emphasized that this
law must be respected, yet she said in her CI, “I wish for the strengths of the club to
continue...because…the project has the same vision and goals as the government to develop the
local population. These goals are important and your project follows them!” She wanted the
TACP to continue because it had the same initiatives as the government; nonetheless, she would
not allow us to carry out activities, such as the trainings. Less time for TAC meetings with the
PBs ensured more time for their presence at imiganda and government-directed meetings.100
Therefore, it can be concluded that by her contradictions she either (a) did not support the
TACP, but wanted to appease the government because it supposedly supports similar community
development projects, or (b) wanted to appease the government with her tight controls of the
TACP by ensuring that the PBs would not miss any last-minute government meetings because of
planned project activities. Appeasing top government officials was more important and urgent to
99

Government leaders higher up the RPF hierarchy than themselves.

100

Through her insistence of the MINALOC regulation, she was hinting that the PBs must have time to go to the imiganda and government
meetings, but she would not acknowledge that they needed adequate time to attend the TAC meetings and trainings. However, even if the
TACP’s 15 APBs were occasionally absent from the government meetings, the number would not have been large enough to have an impact
on the attendance at these meetings. The TACP only required one child and one adult per beneficiary family to be present at TAC trainings.
Other family members could have gone to the government-directed meetings.
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her than supporting the TACP’s advancement and the development of Gitarama citizens for
whom she was working. One can see this when comparing her proposals of timeframes for the
TACP’s activities with the other two LLs; they gave rationale ideas whereas hers were not (refer
to section, 4.2.2.2.1.2. Refusal to Conduct Trainings). Her proposals appeased the government,
the “attacker”, while at the same time gave the impression that the government cares about
community development projects, and the independency and sustainability of communities these
projects promote.
4.2.3.6. Dependency Syndrome
Within Gitarama, most of the locals are stimulated to work for their community and
themselves by the extrinsic motivators of appeasement and DS. Numerous developmental
projects in the country since the genocide have fostered a DS in the public. Many countries,
NGOs, and private donors with huge sums of money for post-conflict reconstruction and
development have crippled the populations’ intrinsic motivation to work hard and ultimately
progress to independence from exterior aid. The TACP PSs expected this avalanche of goods, as
well. One CPB was already involved in a project called COMPASSION, giving items and money
to beneficiaries just for attending meetings. Her guardian commented in her interview, “Most
people ask themselves if this project will be strong and help them like COMPASSION project. In
COMPASSION…there are no problems. The parents find something [money and personal items]
when they go to meetings and trainings.” Conversely, dependency on these types of projects is
unsustainable, harming Rwandans’ self-esteem and belief in their own abilities to be selfsufficient.
DS appeared clearly in the TACP—thirty-one percent of the PSs interviewed overtly
expressed they expected free hand-outs. In fact, it very likely assisted in hindering its success by
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causing indifference and diffusion of responsibility. Thirty-eight percent of the PSs gave
statements in their CIs that revealed an indifferent attitude towards the project, relating to DS.
Some statements, such as, “We need to take care of the rabbits, especially the club members who
live closest to the school” (APB), demonstrated diffusion of responsibility. Sixty-two percent of
PBs recognized free-ranging the chickens at home solved the chickens’ hunger problems, but
some believed that imported poultry was of better quality, unlike the local breed. Denying their
negligent behavior, they articulated their want for imported chickens: “Local chickens are not
productive. We need muzungu (‘white man’) chickens, instead” (APB). LL A also rejected the
traditional way of allowing the chickens to scavenge as a sustainable solution to feeding them.
She insisted that the TACP provide more money for poultry feed, instead of encouraging the PBs
to create a schedule for letting the chickens free-range daily and/or cooperate to raise money for
supplemental feed. LL B stated during her CI, “You [myself] need to look for more money to
give to the club to buy chicken food.”
DS was mirrored by LLs in their responses to other CQ questions, as well. One LL
commented, “People are hard to manage,” which implies that she believes Rwandans are
extrinsically motivated and programmed to be dependent on others. The three LLs all suggested
giving money to each PB in the form of per diems for each meeting or training attended to
encourage participation. This money ranged in value from 500-3,000 RWF (roughly $1-$6). In
addition, they also urged offering small gifts, like tee-shirts. LL A explained, “Other NGOs give
at least 1,500-2,000 RWF (roughly $3-$4) per training to each beneficiary so they can buy
something afterwards. Small things like tee-shirts can also motivate them.”101
101

It is important to reiterate that the grant was only for $500, which would not have been enough money to provide all the PBs with per diems
for each meeting and training. This is why every effort was made to schedule the time, duration, frequency, and location of meetings and
trainings around their convenience. As this project was striving to be sustainable from a small budget, giving per diem would have been
disadvantageous. One LL recognized the significance of this and contradicted herself in her CI by saying, “These rural people should easily
understand why they are not receiving money for coming to the trainings. You are already giving them animals and vegetables through the
animal husbandry and gardening activities.”
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“There are people who still do not know the benefits of the project…When they [club
members] do not see you [myself] coming, they stop to do anything [sic]” (APB). This remark
stresses the possible DS among the PBs. Most people expected extrinsic rewards prior to putting
forth any effort towards the TACP, despite the fact their work would later benefit them. One
common behavioral characteristic of collectivist societies is to look only at the present; the PBs
adhere to this characteristic. They want to see immediate, tangible results rather than work for
sustainable goods, and even more so because they might have DS. If people are used to receiving
things with no effort on their part, they become amotivated to support and better themselves.
The mass exodus of refugees into the Democratic Republic of Congo during the genocide
is evidence that most of the PSs were at one time in a refugee camp. According to reports
described in the literature review, DS developed in refugees of post-conflict Sudan, Algeria,
Cambodia, Sri Lanka, Northern Uganda, and Mozambique, and almost certainly so in Rwandan
refugees as well, since the chaotic situation of 1994 was similar to those of the other six
countries. The plethora of foreign aid coming in after the genocide adds to the DS that most
Rwandans could have developed beforehand, from previous foreign assistance. Learned
helplessness and the PTSS of hopelessness associated with trauma, and living under a totalitarian
regime make them susceptible to controlled motivation to partake in imiganda and governmentdirected meetings, and amotivation and DS to participate in the TACP, as indicated by the selfdetermination theory.
Authoritarian/totalitarian-HV Theory X leadership, corruption, and post-conflict trauma
have devastating effects on the sustainability of local level development, resulting in
disappointing outcomes of community projects. If the PBs of the TACP would have had: a fair
democratic voice in the community, sufficient free time to devote to TAC activities, support of
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leaders, opportunities for advancement independent from corruption, harmonious relationships
among other community members, freedom of speech, and possibilities for mental health healing
and PTG, they might have had the intrinsic motivation to make the project successful.
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DISCUSSION
5.1. Conclusions
The collected data showed similar patterns in case studies done in other post-conflict
societies emerging from violence, as well as supports the research and existing theories on
trauma, corruption, and leadership in conflict and post-conflict contexts. Seven major factors
were discovered to have directly affected the implementation of the TACP upon analyzing the
data: (a) corruption among LLs (b) domestic problems of PBs (c) (likely) fear that LLs and
locals harbor (d) (probable) dependency syndrome of LLs and locals (e) indifference of LLs and
locals (f) division among the PBs (g) tight controls by local leaders. Fifty-two percent of PBs
offered solutions in their CIs to fix the problems in the project; however the combination of these
major factors heavily affected the collaboration of the PBs to carry out any of their suggestions.
Table 13 (p. 77) shows these seven factors, their key causes, and the overall resulting
consequences in the TACP. Figure 21 (p. 78) shows significant supporting evidence of the
factors presented in Table 13 that the PBs reported during the CI and observed in the field. The
evidence is charted under the seven major factors. The findings of Table 13 indicate that some
causes, major factors, and consequences overlap each other. Furthermore, some supporting
evidence shown in Figure 21 is classified under more than one factor.
The research was performed in one community of Rwanda. However, the findings might
be observed in locals in different regions since this small country has the same culture,
experienced the same horrific events, is under the same totalitarian regime, and is participating in
similar development projects like the TACP. Through the analysis of my own data and
examination of the existing literature, I conclude that three principal issues are might be
preventing real sustainable development from taking place in rural communities in Rwanda:
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Table 13

Major Factors That Affected the Twizere Agriculture Club Project,
Their Key Causes, and the Overall Resulting Consequences
* Note: The constraints are not presented in any order of significance

CAUSES
Tight controls by local leaders
Corruption by local leaders
Indifference

Fear and anger
Corruption by local leaders
Tight controls by local leaders
Trauma of locals
Indifference
Dependency Syndrome

Tight controls by local leaders
Trauma of locals

Tight controls by local leaders
Trauma of locals
Profusion of development
projects before and after the
genocide
Locals were refugees
Dependency syndrome
Fear and anger
Tight controls by local leaders
Trauma of locals
Domestic problems

Fear and anger
Tight controls by local leaders
Trauma of locals

Fear
Corruption by
local leaders

FACTORS

CORRUPTION

DOMESTIC PROBLEMS

CONSEQUENCES
No organization of the club’s parent committee
Project stakeholders became indifferent
Club animals became sick and died
Discontinuation of project activities
No collaboration between project beneficiaries
No communication between school leaders,
project beneficiaries, and myself
No organization of the club’s parent committee
Project beneficiaries became indifferent
Club animals became sick and died
Discontinuation of project activities
No collaboration between project beneficiaries
No communication between school leaders,
project beneficiaries, and myself
No organization of the club’s parent committee
Project beneficiaries became indifferent
Club animals became sick and died
Discontinuation of project activities

FEAR

DEPENDENCY
SYNDROME

No collaboration between project beneficiaries
No communication between school leaders,
project beneficiaries, and myself
No organization of the club’s parent committee
Project stakeholders became indifferent
Club animals became sick and died
Discontinuation of project activities

INDIFFERENCE
of project stakeholders
and
DIFFUSE OF
RESPONSIBILITY
by project beneficiaries

No collaboration between project beneficiaries
No communication between school leaders,
project beneficiaries, and myself
No organization of the club’s parent committee
Club animals became sick and died
Discontinuation of project activities

DIVISION
among project beneficiaries

No collaboration between project beneficiaries
No communication between school leaders,
project beneficiaries, and myself
No organization of the club’s parent committee
Project beneficiaries became indifferent
Club animals became sick and died
Discontinuation of project activities

TIGHT CONTROLS
by local leaders
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No organization of the club’s parent committee
Project beneficiaries became indifferent
Club animals became sick and died
Discontinuation of project activities

Figure 21 Significant Supporting Evidence of the Major Factors
That Affected the Twizere Agriculture Club Project
Reported by Project Stakeholders and Gathered From Observations

Key:
Group 1 project beneficiaries
inappropriately identified (100%)

Corruption

Project stakeholders who observed
problems with the rabbit hutch (62%)

Domestic
Problems

Project stakeholders who said that
other project stakeholders are indifferent to
the project and other project beneficiaries
diffuse their responsibility in the project
(38%)
Adult project beneficiaries who said
that people in Gitarama have domestic
problems (36%)

Major constraints of the Twizere Agriculture Club Project

Fear

Women in the club are widows or
their husbands are absent from the home
(67%)
Project stakeholders who said
members in the parent committee are
divided (23%)

Dependency
Syndrome

Project stakeholders exhibited
probable dependency syndrome (31%)

Indifference
of project
stakeholders
and
Diffuse of
Responsibility
by project
beneficiaries

Project stakeholders who said the
parent committee is not organized and
does not communicate with the other
project beneficiaries (35%)
Project stakeholders who did not agree
with local leader A and local leader B’s
decision to give control of the club animals
to the school’s night guard (30%)
Project stakeholders who said project
beneficiaries are divided (35%)

Division
among project
beneficiaries

Project stakeholders who realized
hunger was the cause of the chickens’
health problems (62%)
Project stakeholders displayed anger,
fear, and mistrust during the CIs (46%)
Adult project beneficiaries who said
their absence was the fault of excess
imiganda and government-directed
meetings (57%)

Tight Controls
by local leaders

Project beneficiaries expressed interest
and need to participate in club trainings
(39%)
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Project beneficiaries who realized the
health of the club animals was suffering
staying at the school because of the
negligence of the project stakeholders and
the incompetence of the school’s night
guard (57%)

(a) The PSs of the TACP (and possibly the whole society of Rwanda, including its
leaders) may be (still) suffering from individual and collective trauma attributable to horrific past
experiences, and present unstable living conditions. The availability of assistance (especially
culturally and contextually) for mental health recovery and PTG of survivors is scarce.
Collective healing, peace and reconciliation, or nation-wide sustainable, grassroots community
development cannot successfully ensue without recovery occurring first, no matter how many
theoretical models are devised. A monolithic and strict authority-heeding culture, the many
components of traumatism, and an uncertainty of violence and chaos through retribution and
punishments from authorities most likely keep the citizenry divided and in a permanent state of
internalized active and passive avoidance.
(b) The RPF uses the authoritarian/command and control style of ruling (HV Theory X
leadership) and functions as a totalitarian regime to maintain power and prevent retaliation from
individual opposition. Living under totalitarian leadership encourages the civilians to succumb to
any pre-existing urges of engaging in corruption, which they unquestionably do. To ordinary
locals under a totalitarian regime, corruption is a survival tactic, and to (new) leaders and the
elite, it is an opportunity to advance as quickly as possible by their newly established power.
(c) The majority of the (rural) population has probable DS. The enormous amounts of
foreign aid for post-conflict reconstruction and sustainable development, plus inappropriate
project designs and improper monitoring of funds, are assisting (along with trauma and
leadership), in the destruction of locals’ intrinsic motivation to progress and to be self-reliant.

5.2. Recommendations for Development Workers in Post-Conflict/Genocide Societies
Drawn from the findings of my research, I present a hypothesis that I have created,
named The Post-Conflict/Genocide Development Hypothesis. It states: The continual effects of
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internal, protracted conflict/genocide and the irrevocable change in the essential nature and
personality of a nation, govern all levels of societal development, especially when under corrupt
and/or authoritarian/totalitarian rule. Figure 22—The Post-conflict/Genocide Society Model—
is a model I created of the dynamics of a post-conflict/genocide society under an
authoritarian/totalitarian regime, displaying the continuous interactions among four elements—
corruption, trauma, leaders, and locals. It helps to illustrate the Post-Conflict/Genocide
Development Hypothesis (See Figure 22, p. 81).
Survivors of protracted, internal conflict and/or genocide have unique needs—the main
necessity being individual psychological counseling/mental health support. Therefore,
community development projects and programs should not be designed and implemented with
the same guidelines and benchmarks as in countries that have not engaged in this sphere of
conflict. Development workers should be especially aware of the following hidden obstacles
when working with locals in post-conflict (protracted, internal)/genocide societies: Appeasement
and falsehood, dysfunctional communal relationships, the presence of PTSS and/or other
psychopathological disorders—including active and passive avoidance—transgenerational
trauma, corrupt acts, domineering leaders, and possible retaliation. These impediments can
unhinge the execution and sustainability of community development projects.
The above three principal issues—trauma, authoritarian/totalitarian-HV Theory X
leadership, and DS—will continue to block real sustainable development in Rwanda if they are
not properly addressed. Authoritarian/totalitarian leadership with its tight controls is one the
biggest challenges facing post-conflict reconstruction, peace and reconciliation, and sustainable
development in disaster and conflict-torn countries. Advocating for a change in policies is
necessary in order to change the three identified issues. However, if the government and the
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Figure 22

The Post-Conflict/Genocide Society Model102

Behaviors of
Leaders/Locals
Leaders

(Authoritarian/totalitarian,
hard-version Theory X
leadership)

Locals

(Appeasement,
dependency syndrome,
post-traumatic stress
symptoms,
psychopathological
disorders,
mistrust, fear, anger,
behavioral changes to an
individualist culture)

TRAUMA
in Citizens

Post-conflict/genocide
Society

Leaders

(For profit)

CORRUPTION
by Citizens
Locals

(Survival tactic)

traumatized public so skillfully conceal the threats of a dictatorship and the effects of chronic
collective trauma, how can the administration of stated democratic policies truly be verified?
Another dilemma is meeting the demands of the donor when executing a multi-million (US)
dollar development project, while at the same time minimizing corruption and DS, and
empowering and uniting traumatized locals.
The challenge is to implement projects that meet the long-term needs of these populations
102

Model designed by Bryna C. Ramsey
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and remain within the approved government guidelines. Unfortunately, most development
projects are designed to appease governments and donors, ignoring the real long-term needs of
the people. Post-conflict trauma feasibly will have profound effects on individuals and the
activities they undertake for years to come. The following recommendations are from
experiences with the TACP implementation. These insights may be potentially beneficial and
may be applied by development workers engaging in community development projects in similar
contexts as that of Rwanda. They may help prevent some or all of the identified constraints in
any future project implementations by ameliorating the conditions under which they exist. It is
suggested that research be carried out on the effectiveness of each given recommendation.
(a) Make trauma counseling accessible to PBs—invest in intensive training of local
Rwandans in counseling techniques. Nevertheless, survivors may have severe trust issues and
may not tell their entire experience in front of fellow Rwandans, thus inhibiting real healing.
Therefore, investing in foreign professional psychologists103 who have had training in crosscultural counseling and a variety of traditional mental health healing methods, as well as the
local language, also should be considered.104 They should have a high level of fluency in the
language to communicate with the patients without the need of a translator present.
(b) Invest in local language training of (foreign) development workers so they can do
better monitoring of project activities. Again, a high level of fluency in the local language will
reduce possibilities of manipulation by local leaders engaging in corruption, and will build trust
between community members and the development workers.
(c) Place foreign development workers in the field to be part of the identification team to
103

Foreign psychologists do not have to be limited to Western psychologists. Other Africans can be just as, or more, beneficial in counseling
survivors since African cultures are more similar in comparison than African and Western cultures. Finding available professional
psychologists is a challenge, but necessary, as individual psychological healing needs to occur before the collective trauma can diminish and
true reconciliation can take place.

104

Mental health illnesses are not defined the same in all cultures. Therefore, Western psychologists should use the local culture’s definitions of
mental health illnesses when diagnosing, being culturally sensitive and aware of the local taboos regarding mental health.
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monitor the process of beneficiary selection instead of leaving the task solely up to the
community. One honest and reliable foreigner from the monitoring and evaluation (M&E) team
(who knows the language well) should always be in the field to reduce corruption opportunities.
(d) Conduct private, one-on-one interviews with the beneficiaries when doing
participatory needs analysis to reduce anxiety and fear. This will help the identification team
receive truthful information about people’s needs.105
(e) Once the identification of beneficiaries is finished, allow them to choose from among
themselves responsible and able project leaders. The beneficiaries should be encouraged not to
overlook marginalized or very poor individuals. Empowering them through opportunities of
leadership may increase self-esteem, leading to more interest and enthusiasm for the project,
unity among beneficiaries, prevention of corruption, and thus, successful project implementation
and sustainability.106 Discuss with/train the chosen leaders about their responsibilities to the
project and create Memorandums of Understandings (MoU).
(f) Establish a support system for widows, women with absentee husbands, and childheaded households so they can better commit to the project. One example is to give per diems to
those marginalized or at-risk individuals at the beginning of the project and then reduce the
quantity and frequency given after establishing a functioning cooperative. Another example is to
hold meetings and trainings in the evenings to work around the beneficiaries’ schedules.107
(g) Limit the amount of per diems given to beneficiaries and hold them more accountable
for the goods and services they receive. To help reduce DS, design the projects so the majority of
the money received is a result of their work. Sign a MoU with LLs during the planning phase
105

It is important, however, to spend a sufficient amount of time building relationships first with the community before attempting interviews.

106

The most vulnerable have special needs, but they may take more pride and responsibility in the project since it may be their only consistent
means of living. This may help encourage them to unite the other beneficiaries.

107

The Barefoot College in India is one example of a grassroots developmental program where children, who must work in the family fields
during the day, attend school at night. For more information about Barefoot College, visit at www.barefootcollege.org.
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about when and how much per diem beneficiaries will receive.
(h) Negotiate the duration and frequency of trainings, meetings, and other project
activities with LLs. Outline all stipulations of the project and of community activities (e.g.
mandatory community meetings). Communicate with LLs the roles and responsibilities each
beneficiary will have in the project. Document these things discussed and sign a MoU with LLs.

5.3. Recommendations for Further Research
The 1994 Genocide has created some very complicated issues in the Rwandan society.
Research on trauma among Rwandans is greatly lacking since the early aftermath of the
genocide. The experiences with the TACP and the findings of the analysis illuminate the
necessity for further quantitative research with a larger sampling of Rwandans on the prevalence
of psychopathological disorders, particularly PTSD and CPTSD, and collective trauma
associated with the event. Follow-up studies on the duration of trauma within the population are
essential to understanding the necessities and dynamics of the country. More specifically,
research examining transgenerational PTSS in children of the genocide victims may help in
understanding the effects of the perpetuation of trauma into future generations.
Further study of behavior changes from Rwanda’s collectivist culture to an individualist
culture may help to understand how collective trauma has altered the culture, as well as studies
on DS among Rwandans may assist in better implementation of community development
projects at the grassroots level by governments, NGOs, private investors, and faith-based
organizations. Research in these suggested areas also should be carried out in additional related
settings to compare post-conflict/genocide Rwanda with other countries and enhance
understanding of the effects of collective trauma on community development.
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APPENDICES
Appendix A: Maps of Rwanda
Figure 1

Figure 2

Map of Africa108
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Source: WorldAtlas © www.worldatlas.com
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Source: Integrated Food Security Phase Classification (IPC) © 2009 www.ipcinfo.org
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Figure 3

Map of Rwanda110

Figure 4

Map of Rwanda (Provinces)111
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Source:: Africa New Life Ministries (ANLM) http://ibcrwanda.wordpress.com/about/
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Source: Maps of the World © 2010 www.mapsofworld.com
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Appendix B: Significant Events in Rwandan History
Figure 5 is a timeline of major events in Rwandan history from early immigration and
civilization to colonization, the genocide, and post-genocide reconstruction. However, accounts
of early periods of civilization up to the beginning events before the genocide in 1992 and 1993
could be somewhat biased because Rwandan culture is historically oral and Europeans and
Rwandan elites recorded early written versions.112

Figure 5

Timeline of Major Events in Rwandan History113
(~100 B.C. to 1975 A.D.)

112

For more information on the history of Rwanda, see Des Forges’s book, Defeat is the Only Bad News: Rwanda Under Musinga 1896-1931
(2011).

113

Timeline by Bryna C. Ramsey; information in timeline from Des Forges (1999), Government of Rwanda (2012), and U.S. Department of
State Bureau of African Affairs (2011).
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Figure 5 (Continued) Timeline of Major Events in Rwandan History
(1970s A.D. to 1994 A.D.)

Figure 5 (Continued) Timeline of Major Events in Rwandan History
(1994 A.D. to Present)
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Appendix C: Microgardens
gardens throughout the country is an important development initiative of
The use of microgardens
GOR as one way to combat malnutrition
malnutrition.114 Microgarden techniques and cultivating methods to
have been taught in TAC are kitchen
itchen (keyhole) garden, sack/container garden,, mandala (pothole)
garden, square-meter garden,, permac
permaculture garden, double-dug (raised bed) garden,
garden sunken bed
(trench) garden, organic pest control, double-digging, and composting.

Kitchen (Keyhole) Garden
The pyramid-shaped
shaped kitchen (keyhole) garden is placed conveniently near the kitchen.
kitchen A
compost basket,, placed in the center, uses kitchen waste (organic matter) to keep the soil fertile.
A mixture of manure and soil is added around the compost basket and inside the barrier.
barrier
Figure 6

Photos of Kitchen (Keyhole) Garden

←

Source: Bryna C. Ramsey (2010)

Source: Bryna C. Ramsey (2009)

→

← Source: Bryna C. Ramsey (2010)

Source: www.foragedroots.blogspot.com

→

114

For more information, go to the websites of the GOR’s Ministry of Health ((www.moh.gov.rw), Ministry of Agriculture and Livestock
(MINAGRI) (www.minagri.gov.rw),, and Agricul
Agriculture Management Information System (AMIS) (www.amis.minagri.gov.rw
www.amis.minagri.gov.rw).
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Sack/Container Garden
The sack/container garden takes very little space and its size makes crop maintenance
easy. This technique uses materials that are available locally and depending on the size, it can
produce a large yield of vegetables. One method used creates a channel of small stones for water
filtration in the sack and adds a mixture of sand, soil, and manure around the channel.

Figure 7

Source: Bryna C. Ramsey (2009)

Sack/Container Garden Photos

Source: Bryna C. Ramsey (2011)

Source: Catholic Relief Services
http://crs.org/agriculture/stories

Mandala (Pothole) Garden
A mandala garden (also known as pothole garden) is shaped in a half circle and is built
using the double-dig technique. It is placed near a water source to recycle gray water, which is
poured into the center of the garden. The soil filters the soap, leaving clean water to travel to the
roots of the plants. The mandala (pothole) garden is great for arid and semi-arid regions.
Figure 8

Mandala (Pothole) Garden Photos

Source: www.cowfiles.com © 2010 →

←

Source:
www.bedroom-culture.tumblr.com
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Square-Meter Garden
The square-meter garden uses one square meter plot of prepared soil measured into nine
squares. A different type of vegetable is planted in each of the nine squares, vine vegetables
being planted in the outside ones. When each plant is harvested, new seeds are immediately
replanted using a rotation method so soil is always being replenished with nutrients and a steady
supply of vegetables are always available.
Figure 9

Square-Meter Garden Photos

Source: www.selfsufficientlife.net © 2012

Source: www.partners.net © 2012

Permaculture Garden
Permaculture is a technique to grow many different kinds of vegetables and fruit trees on
a smaller plot of land; however, more space is used than some of the other microgardens.
Trenches on all four sides of the garden and shallow holes at all four corners are dug to help
direct the flow of water, which makes it very useful in arid and semi-arid regions. The doubledig technique is used, helping roots penetrate deep into the soil for better and more plant growth.
Figure 10

Permaculture Garden Photos

Source:
Bryna C. Ramsey (2011)

→
←

Source:
www.mayalau.com
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Sunken Bed (Trench) and Double-Dug (Raised Bed) Gardens
The sunken bed garden (also known as trench garden) uses about the same amount of
space as the permaculture garden, but the size of the garden can be adapted to the area. Sunken
bed (trench) gardens are made in very arid regions because they maintain water and moisture
better than other microgardens.
icrogardens. It uses the double
double-digging
digging technique, but the second layer of soil
is removed
moved (as opposed to the double
double-dug
dug garden which leaves the second layer of broken up
soil). Removing the soil makes the bed sunken, like an umbrella, so water is collected and held
better. The double-dug
dug garden (also known as rai
raised bed garden) uses the double-dig
double
technique,
which makes the beds lookk like raised mounds and helps give better quantity and quality
qua
of crop
production. Double-dug
dug beds are used in both the mandala and permaculture gardens.
garden

Figure 11

Sunken Bed (Trench) Gar
Garden and Double-Dug (Raised Bed) Garden Photos

Sunken Bed (Trench) Garden
Source: www.azpm.org © 2007-2008
2008

Sunken Bed (Trench) Garden
Source: www.soiladventures.wordpress.com
soiladventures.wordpress.com

Double-Dug (Raised Bed) Garden
Source: Bryna C. Ramsey (2011)

Double-Dug
Dug (Rasied Bed) Garden
Source: www.urbanshare.blogspot.com
urbanshare.blogspot.com
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Double-Digging Method
Double-digging is a very helpful cultivating method to use in gardening because the roots
go deeper and do not compete with each other. This allows the plants to grow stronger and
healthier, and prevents soil erosion. Double-digging allows more air and water to aerate and
irrigate large areas of soil. The concept is simple: dig the first layer of soil in a small area of the
bed. Remove the top layer, and dig and break up compacted soil of the second layer. This allows
plant roots to push deeper into the ground. Add ash or manure and fill the hole with the top layer
of soil. A garden cultivated using the double-dug technique can be used for three years without
needing to add more manure or do intense tilling/soil preparation each year.

Figure 12

Double-Digging Technique Photos

Source: www.katemriley.wordpress.com

Source: www.elgincommunitygarden.wordpress.com
Source: http://blog.springmeadoworganics.com
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Appendix D: Twizere Agriculture Club Project Design
Twizere Agriculture Club Project Description
Several weeks of casual conservations—the start of a baseline survey—with community
members in the area, led to the realization of the need for food security. The initial idea of an
agriculture club, focusing on small animal husbandry and microgardens, was agreed upon with
local leaders (LLs), especially LL A, and myself. I applied for, and received, a $500 grant
through a program called Kids to Kids from the organization, World Connect.
During a preliminary meeting with Gitarama Primary School (GPS) personnel and
parents of students, I emphasized the project would begin small due to limited funds; because of
this, it should focus on knowledge and skills training with the project beneficiaries (PBs). The
idea was embraced with great enthusiasm by all meeting attendees. LL A and I established the
guidelines for the project. The club would start with a group of fifteen GPS student club
members, who would graduate from the club at the end of six months. A new group of another
15 students would rotate into the project, replacing the previous group. Through these six-monthrotations, eventually all the GPS students would be able to participate in the project.
Each child project beneficiary (CPB) would choose an adult (parent/guardian, etc.) to
also participate in the project and assit them in implementing club activities at home. After the
six-month period, the PBs would take home at least one pair of rabbits and one pair of chickens,
plus vegetables produced from club activities. If there would be a surplus of animals or
vegetables during the six months, the PBs could take them home sooner.
The planned exit strategy was to involve and train GPS personnel in all aspects of the
project. Additionally, some graduated PBs would serve as peer educators in future club groups,
assisting GPS personnel. The initial identification of the first group of PBs was done by
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Table 1

Identification Criteria for the Twizere Agriculture Club Project Beneficiaries

The child beneficiary must:
•

Not possess any animals at home

•

Be between the ages of 11-15 or in grades 1-5 (many children started school late)

•

Demonstrate a need for food security

•

Be “at-risk” in some way (be extremely poor, orphan or vulnerable child (OVC), affected by
or infected with HIV, malnourished, etc.)

•

Contract not to sell or kill their animals (when taken home) until they produce a sufficient
number to sustain the group of animals

•

Be willing to attend all meetings, trainings, and home visits and participate in the activities
unless an unforeseeable circumstance arises (send a substitute person—another family
member, neighbor, etc.— if absence is necessary)

•

Be willing to implement club activities at home

GPS personnel using criteria formulated by them and myself (see Table 1). It was agreed upon
by all that each beneficiary family identified would have to meet all the IC, and if there were no
families in Gitarama that could meet all the criteria, then exceptions would be made. In order to
verify if the IC was followed, I wanted to continue conducting the baseline survey with the
identified PBs. However, this was not made possible by LL A.
During the first club meeting, the beneficiaries, LL A, LL B, and I reviewed plans for
animal purchase, animal housing construction, other club activities, and the importance of club
member participation and responsibility. It was decided that the project would be located at GPS
to serve as a school-wide curriculum and as a (positive deviance) model to the local community.
The 15 adult beneficiaries (parent/guardian club members) elected among themselves, a small
group to serve as a committee to help oversee the functioning of club activities. The parent
committee (PCOM) originated an idea of a cooperative for the club that would be supervised by
PCOM members. Implementation of the project was planned to begin immediately.
102

Table 2 Twizere Agriculture Club Project Logframe
Objectives
ULTIMATE GOAL

Measurable Indicators

Means of Verification

• All community members increased each family member’s food
intake by 1 meal per day

• Baseline and endline
HH surveys

• Families successfully
implement project activities at
home
• Families practice KSA learned
in the project
• Support from local leaders
continues

• Percentage of targeted families increasing each family member’s
food intake by 1 meal per day

• Baseline and endline
HH surveys

• Families successfully
implement project activities at
home
• Families practice KSA learned
in the project

• Number of meeting(s) held with parents of GPS students, GPS
leaders, and teachers to introduce project idea and discuss logistics of
club
• Beneficiary identification criteria established by GPS personnel
(leaders and teachers) and program manager
• Number of beneficiary families identified by GPS personnel and
project manager
• Club’s elected PCOM established
• Number of PCOM members understanding their elected roles
• Number of PCOM members fulfilling their elected roles
• Percentage of scheduled meetings and trainings being held
• Percentage of beneficiaries regularly attending meetings and
trainings
• Club gardens and compost piles thriving
• Steady production rate of purchased animals in first year
• Club’s cooperative installed
• Steady growth rate of club cooperative’s savings account
• Successful rotation of “graduated” beneficiaries and second group of
beneficiaries

• Identified project
beneficiary lists
• Project manager
interviews and
evaluation with chosen
beneficiaries
• Attendance records of
meetings and trainings
• Progress reports from
beneficiaries, school
personnel, and local
leaders
• Individual interviews
and focus groups with
beneficiaries
• Individual and focus
group discussions with
PCOM members

Increase food security
among all Gitarama Cell
community members to
assist the Government
of Rwanda meet the
objectives of Vision 2020
Development Plan
IMPACT GOAL
Increase food security by
20% among 15 families in
the Gitarama Cell
community (Karongi
District, Rwanda) by
July 2011
PURPOSE
Establish an ongoing
agriculture club by July
2011 at Gitarama Primary
School (GPS) with an
initial beneficiary group of
15 students (from GPS) and
their 15 parents/guardians

Important Assumptions
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• Community has need for the
project
• Community has desire for the
project
• GPS personnel and local leaders
support the project
• Beneficiaries have time to devote
to project activities
• Beneficiaries collaborate for the
good of the club
• Beneficiaries fulfill their
designated responsibilities to the
project

Objectives

Measurable Indicators

Means of Verification

OUTCOME

• Percentage of beneficiary families’ annual income increased by 20%
• Percentage of beneficiary families whose buying power increased
• Percentage of beneficiary families whose nutrition improved

• HH surveys
• Observations
• Nutrition screenings by
CHWs

• Agriculture club is successfully
implemented
• Club activities thrive
• Successful retail of beneficiaries’
products
• Reliable family member has
possession of money
• Family members at-risk for
malnutrition can access a varied
diet
• CHWs are willing to conduct
nutrition screenings
• Beneficiaries are willing to
attend nutrition screenings
• Beneficiaries and CHWs attend
nutrition screenings

• Percentage of beneficiaries successfully transferring new rabbit and
chicken husbandry concepts and skills at home

• Evaluations through
home visits
• Individual interviews
and focus groups with
beneficiaries

• Beneficiaries are motivated to
implement at home KSA learned
• Beneficiaries have time to attend
meetings and trainings
• Beneficiaries have means to
replicate the animal housing at
home using local materials

Better quality of life for the
15 targeted beneficiary
families through an
increase in availability
of food

OUTPUT 1
Teach the 30 project
beneficiaries
new rabbit and
chicken husbandry
concepts and skills

ACTIVITIES
• Hold oral lecture and
hands-on trainings at
GPS on rabbit and
chicken animal housing
construction, healthy
animal purchase, proper
care (feeding, hydration,
and disease prevention
and treatment),
reproduction, and
processing techniques
• Obtain construction
materials

• Number of beneficiaries trained
• Percentage of beneficiaries passing oral exams
• Number of locals coming to animal fair with enough animals to buy
15 healthy rabbits (2 males and 13 females) and 15 healthy chickens
(1 rooster and 14 hens)
• Number of small groups in the club organized by PCOM to care for
the animals
• Percentage of club animals consistently in good to excellent health
• Animal houses at GPS and beneficiaries’ homes properly maintained
• Number of animals’ offspring doubled from initial purchase by July
2011
• Percentage of beneficiaries having at least 5 healthy chickens and 5
healthy rabbits at home by July 2011
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Important Assumptions

• PCOM organizes meetings to
hold with other beneficiaries to
delegate responsibilities of club
activities
• Beneficiaries attend 80-100% of
meetings and trainings
• All beneficiaries attend 80% of
meetings organized by the
PCOM
• All beneficiaries fulfill their
designated responsibilities
• Host community provides their
contribution of materials as
agreed

Objectives

Measurable Indicators

(CONTINUED)

• Inspections of animals
and animal housing at
beneficiaries’ homes
• Meeting and training
attendence records
• Small groups animal
care logs
• Oral training
comprehension exams
• Animal purchase
records
• Observations

• Percentage of beneficiaries successfully implementing the alternative
gardening concepts and skills at home

Teach the 30 project
beneficiaries alternative
gardening methods

ACTIVITIES
• Obtain training materials
• Hold oral lecture and
hands-on/demonstration
trainings at GPS on the
concepts of 3 cultivating
methods: composting,
organic pest control, and
double-digging; and 7
microgarden techniques:

Important Assumptions

(CONTINUED

• Build model rabbit hutch
and chicken coop at GPS
with beneficiaries and
other community
members
• Hold local animal fair to
purchase animals
• Beneficiaries practice
skills learned about
proper animal care and
reproduction at GPS via
the guidance of the
PCOM
• Hold periodic follow-up
meetings with
beneficiaries for
evaluation
• Beneficiaries
successfully implement
animal husbandry skills
at home
OUTPUT 2

Means of Verification

• Number of beneficiaries trained
• Percentage of beneficiaries passing oral exams
• Number of small groups in the club organized by PCOM to care for
the gardens and compost pile(s)
• Percentage of vegetable plants consistently in good to excellent health
• Gardens and compost piles at GPS and beneficiaries’ homes properly
maintained
• Number of functioning gardens and compost pile(s) beneficiaries have
at home by July 2011
• Percentage of yield gardens at GPS giving by July 2011
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• Evaluations through
home visits
• Individual interviews
and focus groups with
beneficiaries
• Inspections of gardens
and compost piles at
beneficiaries’ homes
• Meeting and training
attendence records
• Logs of garden and
compost pile care by
small groups
• Oral training
comprehension exams
• Observations

• Beneficiaries are motivated to
implement at home KSA learned
• Beneficiaries have time to attend
meetings and trainings
• Beneficiaries have means to
replicate the gardening methods
at home using local materials
• PCOM organizes meetings to
hold with other beneficiaries to
delegate responsibilities of club
activities
• Beneficiaries attend 80-100% of
meetings and trainings
• All beneficiaries attend 80% of
meetings organized by the
PCOM
• All beneficiaries fulfill their
designated responsibilities

Objectives

Measurable Indicators

Means of Verification

(CONTINUED)

(CONTINUED)

kitchen garden,
mandala garden,
sack/container garden,
square-meter garden,
permaculture garden,
double-dug garden, and
sunken bed garden
• Beneficiaries practice
skills learned about
alternative gardening
methods at GPS on
model gardens via the
guidance of the PCOM
• Hold periodic follow-up
meetings with
beneficiaries for
evaluation
• Beneficiaries implement
the alternative gardening
methods at their homes
OUTPUT 3
Teach the 30 project
beneficiaries basic business
skills using the
microfinace system
ACTIVITIES
• Hold oral-lecture
training(s) at GPS on
basic business concepts,
including cooperatives
with all beneficiaries
• Beneficiaries visit market
in Kibuye town and
observe trading activities

Important Assumptions

• Host community provides their
contribution of materials as
agreed

• A functional cooperative is set-up
• Percentage of beneficiaries contributing to the cooperative by July
2011

• Individual interviews
and focus groups with
beneficiaries
• Records of the
cooperative’s activities

• Beneficiaries are motivated to
implement in the cooperative
KSA learned
• Beneficiaries attend 80-100% of
meetings and trainings

• Number of beneficiaries trained
• Percentage of beneficiaries passing oral exams
• Percentage of beneficiaries selling for profit their products taken to the
market
• Elected cooperative officials demonstrating consistent and accurate
record-keeping of all cooperative business
• The cooperative buying needed item(s) for the club and retaining
enough money to support its continuance

• Attendance records of
meetings and trainings
• Minutes from meetings
• Oral training
comprehension exams
• Photos
• Evaluations and
observations of
activities at Kibuye
market

• Beneficiaries attend 80-100% of
meetings and trainings
• Beneficiaries have goods to sell
• Beneficiaries have buyers
• Beneficiaries are honest about
cooperative funds
• Beneficiaries are willing to
contribute funds to the
cooperative when able

106

Objectives

Measurable Indicators

(CONTINUED)

Means of Verification

Important Assumptions

(CONTINUED)

• All beneficiaries visit
market in Kibuye town
and observe trading
activities
• All beneficiaries role
play buying and selling at
a market
• All beneficiaries
participate in actual
market experience by
selling their club goods
• Hold meeting(s) to
organize set-up of club’s
cooperative

• Oral reports from
beneficiaries about
market experiences
• Records of sale
• List of elected
cooperative officials
• Records of the
cooperative’s activities

INPUTS
Project budget:
Project proposal and budget approved by donor and community
Partnership Contribution
(grant)
and Community
Contribution
(donations and purchased
items)

• Letter of approval from
donor
• Signed agreement from
the necessary
individuals for the
community to contribute
some materials to the
project

• The community is not able to
contribute any materials to the
project as required by the donor

Key for Table 2
CHWs = Community Health Workers

HH = Household

GPS = Gitarama Primary School

KSA = Knowledge, Skills, Attitude
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PCOM = Parent Committee

Table 3 Twizere Agriculture Club Project Budget
Exchange Rate: 570 Rwandan Francs (RWF) =
1 US Dollar (USD)

Partner Contribution
Purchased Item

Unit

Quantity Needed

Unit Cost
(RWF)

Total Cost
(RWF)

Total Cost
(USD)

Screen
Wood
Logs
Nails
Hammer
Tin
Labor workers
Rabbits
Chickens
Total Partnership
Contribution

Meter
Board
Log
Kilo
Hammer
Sheet
Man
Rabbit
Chicken

15
20
50
1.5
1
7,000
2,000
2,500
3,000

2,000
1,500
500
2,500
1,500
15
2
15
15

30,000
30,000
25,000
3,750
1,500
105,000
4,000
37,500
45,000

53
53
44
7
3
184
7
66
79

281,750

496

Community Contribution
Purchased Item

Unit

Quantity Needed

Unit Cost
(RWF)

Total Cost
(RWF)

Total Cost
(USD)

Seeds115
Cement
Chalk
Big Notebook
Pens
Subtotal

Packet
Sack
Box
Notebook
Pen

1,000
1
1
1
2

100
12,000
500
500
100

100,000
12,000
500
500
200

Donated Item116

Unit

Quantity Needed

Land117
Rent classroom

Meter (sq.)
1 hour

Total Cost
(RWF)
(estimated value)
189,000
28,000

Manure118 (Cow)
Total Community
Contribution

Rice sack

600
56
(2 hours x 28 weeks)
42

Unit Cost
(RWF)
(estimated value)
315
500

175
21
0.88
0.88
0.35
198
Total Cost
(USD)
(estimated value)
332
49

1,000

42,000

74

372,200

653
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The project budgeted enough seeds for planting seven gardens during trainings with three project groups of beneficiaries during the first two
years. (The project’s first year would have had only one group of club members since it takes time to implement a new project. The club
would have begun regular six-month rotations of groups starting in the second year. In total, the first two years of the project would have had
three groups of beneficiaries and four in later years). Each beneficiary family was to receive 20 seed packets to use at their homes for the first
time they built the gardens. (20 packets x (15 families + 1 training) x 3 groups = 960 packets + 40 extra = 1,000 seed packets in total). After
two years, it was estimated that the cooperative of the club would have enough money to continue buying seeds, or the local government of
BS would provide seeds again (by either donating money or applying for another grant).
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Vaccinations for the chickens were not budgeted for four reasons: (1) they are expensive (2) they are not widely available in KD (3) it was
anticipated that the project would continuously be producing many chickens and to vaccinate each one would be financially burdening
(4) the local chickens have a strong immunity against many of the common diseases in Rwanda. Furthermore, most Rwandans do not
vaccinate their chickens, especially in the rural areas.
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The local government of BS already owns the land where GPS is located, as well as the school building where some trainings would be held.
The local government of Gitarama Cell was to donate the items of land and renting of one classroom to the project at estimated values of
$332 USD for the land and $98 USD for the classroom.
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It was assessed that for the first two groups (1 year), manure would be donated. Most manure can be found free in Rwanda, with the
occasional exception of cow manure, which varies in price. The project budgeted that on average, each rice sack of cow manure would be
about $1.75 USD. After the first year, the project would have been able to provide itself manure from the club’s chickens and rabbits.
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Table 4

Activity

Twizere Agriculture Club Project Gantt Chart119

July
2010

Aug.
2010

Month 1

Month 2

Weeks
1-2

Weeks
3-4

Weeks
5-6

Weeks
7-8

Sept.-Oct
2010

Nov.-Dec.
2010

Jan.-Feb.
2011

Mar.-Apr.
2011

May
2011

June
2011

Months
3-4

Months
5-6

Months
7-8

Months
9-10

Month
11

Month
12

Secure
funding
Community
meeting(s)
with local
and school
leaders,
teachers, and
parents at
GPS
Identify first
group of
beneficiaries
Gather &
transport
animal
housing
construction
materials
Build
rabbit hutch
and chicken
coop
Buy animals
Conduct
club
meetings
Conduct
club
trainings
Club
members
implement
practices
at their
homes
Monitoring
and
Evaluation
activities
Transition of
Group 1 club
members
to Group 2

Table 4 Key:
= Scheduled time to complete task
119

GPS = Gitarama Primary School

It was anticipated that it would take several weeks to implement the activities of TAC and get them going steadily. Therefore, it was assumed
that the first group of members would participate in the club a few weeks longer than the planned six months.
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Appendix E: The Research Questionnaires and Survey
Constraints Interview Questionnaire for Group 1 Project Beneficiary Research Participants
Date: _____________________

Age (years):

Gender: ________________

10-13 ____ 14-17 ____ 18-24 ____ 25-34 _____ 35-44 _____ 45+ ____

1.)

What are the project’s strengths, if any?

2.)

Have you realized or met with any problems in our project? If yes, what are they? What
can be done differently to fix these problems?

3.)

Were you able to attend all meetings? If not, what were some of the constraints?

4.)

Did you notice anything about the rabbit hutch that might be improved? If so, what?

5.)

Did you notice anything about the chicken coop that might be improved? If so, what?

6.)

Have you noticed any problems with the chickens? (If not, go to question 8).

7.)

8.)

a.

Which problems?

b.

What do you think might have caused these problems?

c.

What might [you] have done differently to prevent/correct these problems?
(Based on what you now know, what could be done differently?)

Have you noticed any problems with the rabbits? (If not, go to question 9).
a.

Which problems?

b.

What do you think might have caused these problems?

c.

What might [you] have done differently to prevent/correct these problems?
(Based on what you now know, what could be done differently?)

What might have prevented you from making any changes to correct/prevent the
problems mentioned in questions 7 and 8?
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9.)

What, if anything, have you learned from the meetings you have attended about raising
rabbits and chickens? Before? During? After?

10.)

What, if anything, have you learned from the meetings you have attended about
gardening techniques? Before? During? After?

11.)

a.

Doing these at your home, are you satisfied with the results? If yes, in what ways?
If not, in what ways?

b.

What, if any, are some alternatives you might try to improve the techniques?

c.

What, if any, limitations are you experiencing that are preventing these gardening
techniques from being successful?

Do you know how to use, build, and/or maintain the following microgarden techniques
and cultivating methods?
a.
b.
c.
d.
e.
f.
g.
h.
i.
j.

Kitchen (Keyhole) Garden
Sack/Container Garden
Mandala (Pothole) Garden
Square-meter Garden
Permaculture Garden
Sunken Bed (Trench) Garden
Double-dug (Raised bed) Garden
Composting
Organic pest control
Double-dig

12.)

Do you use or have any of the above techniques/methods at your home?

13.)

In your opinion, how do you see the project has having benefited you?

14.)

Does this project meet your expectations? If not, how didn’t it?

15.)

What, if anything, could have been done differently in the project (for future groups)?
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Constraints Interview Questionnaire for Local Leaders Research Participants
Date: _____________________

Age (years):
1.)

Gender: ________________

18-24 ____ 25-34 _____ 35-44 _____ 45+ ____

What are your observations, impressions, and opinions of the project?
a.

What strengths did the project have?

b.

What limitations did the project have?

2.)

What requirements do you have for implementing a community project at the local level,
if there are any?

3.)

What are your suggestions for time frames of project’s activities?
(Please fill out the chart below):

Project Activities

Length of Time

Frequency

Trainings
Club meetings
Interviews
Home visits

4.)

What incentives, if any, would you suggest be given to the beneficiaries of the project?

5.)

Do you have any other comments or suggestions regarding the design and
implementation of the project and its activities?

6.)

Did you notice anything about the rabbit hutch that might be improved? If so, what?
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7.)

Did you notice anything about the chicken coop that might be improved? If so, what?

8.)

Have you noticed any problems with the chickens? (If not, go to question 8).

9.)

a.

Which problems?

b.

What do you think might have caused these problems?

c.

What might [you] have done differently to prevent/correct these problems?
(Based on what you now know, what could be done differently?)

Have you noticed any problems with the rabbits? (If not, go to question 9).
a.

Which problems?

b.

What do you think might have caused these problems?

c.

What might [you] have done differently to prevent/correct these problems?
(Based on what you now know, what could be done differently?)
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Wealth Index Survey Questions for Group 1 and Group 2
Project Beneficiary Research Participants

1.)

Do you have animals at home?
a.

If yes, which kinds?

b.

How many of each kind?

2.)

What other assets does your family own? (e.g. radio, jerry can, clay pot, buckets, bed,
school uniform, etc).

3.)

Is there anybody employed in the home?
If yes, what is the job?

4.)

How many times a day do you eat?

5.)

What do you typically eat a day?

6.)

How many times a year do you cultivate?

Observations:
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Appendix F: Supplemental Figures and Table of Data
Figure 14

Number and Percentage of Project Beneficiaries who
ho Learned Chicken and
Rabbit Husbandry, and Microgardening Concepts at the Club Meetings Held

ADULT
Project Beneficiaries (Club Members)
Total Sample
(persons): 14

N = people interviewed who believed that they
learned something from the meetings they attended
about raising chickens and rabbits

N=2

N = people interviewed who believed that they
learned something from the meetings they attended
about microgardening techniques

N=1

14%

7%

CHILD
Project Beneficiaries (Club Members)
Total Sample
(persons): 9

N = people interviewed who believed that they
learned something from the meetings they
attended about microgardening techniques

N = people interviewed who believed that they
learned something from the meetings they
attended about raising chickens and rabbits

N=3

N=1

33%
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11%

Figure 15

Number and Percentage of Project Beneficiaries who Know How
ow to Use, Build,
and/or Maintain Microgarden Techniques and (Alternative) Cultivating Methods,
and who
ho Use or Have Them at Home
Do you know how
to build and/or
maintain
(the following)
microgardens
and/or cultivating
techniques?

ADULT
Project Beneficiaries
(Club Members)
Total Sample (persons):
14

Do you have/use
(the following)
microgardens
and/or cultivating
techniques at
your home?

Microgardens
Techniques

Cultivating
Methods

N=0
Yes
0%
N = 14
No
100%
N=0
Yes

Do you have/use
(the following)
microgardens
and/or cultivating
techniques at
your home?

Total Sample (persons): 9

N = 14
100%

Do you know how
to build and/or
maintain
(the following)
microgardens
and/or cultivating
techniques?

CHILD
Project Beneficiaries
(Club Members)

Table 6

No

0%
N=8
No
89%
N=1
Yes
11%
N = 14
No
100%
N=0
Yes
0%

Microgarden Techniques and (Alternative) Cultivating Methods
too Have Been Taught in the Twizere Agriculture Club


Kitchen (Keyhole) Garden
(with compost basket)



Sack/Container Garden



Mandala (Pothole) Garden



Square-Meter Garden



Permaculture Garden



Sunken Bed (Trench) Garden



Double-Dug (Raised Bed) Garden



Composting



Organic Pest Control



Double-Dig
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Figure 18 Adult Project Beneficiaries who
w
Teach at Gitarama Primary School
and
Adult Project Beneficiaries who Have
H
a
Relationship with
ith a Teacher at Gitarama
G
Primary School, or who are
a Influential
in the Gitarama Community

16

14

12

43% of APBs
interviewed who
teach at GPS and
have a child in
the TACP.

10

8

57% of APBs
interviewed who have a
child in the project, and
who have a relationship
with a teacher at GPS or
are influential in the
Gitarama community.
This number also
includes a CPB who has
an extra resource of help
outside the TACP.

6

4

2

0
ADULT Project Beneficiaries
(Parent/Guardian Club Members)
N = Total in sample

Key for Figure 18:
APBs = Adult Project Beneficiaries
CPB = Child Project
ect Beneficiary
GPS = Gitarama Primary School

T = APBs interviewed who teach at
GPS, and who also have a child in
the TACP.

TACP = Twizere Agriculture Club Project

I = APBs interviewed who have a
child in the project, and who have a
relationship with a teacher at GPS
or are influential in the Gitarama
community. This number also
includes a CPB who has an extra
resource of help outside the TACP.
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Figure 19 ADULT PROJECT BENEFICIARIES’ RELATIONSHIPS WITH
GITARAMA COMMUNITY MEMBERS, AND
ADULT PROJECT BENEFICIARIES’ INFLUENCE IN THE GITARAMA COMMUNITY


Beneficiary is a prison guard.



Beneficiary is the president of the board of parents at Gitarama Primary School. F
Fellow
ellow beneficiaries elected
him to be the president of Twizere Agriculture Club’s parent committee
committee. He owns several cows and goats.



Beneficiary raises and sells cows for a living. He also works at the Gitarama Cell administrative office as a
member of the political ruling part
party, Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF).



Beneficiary works at the Gitarama Cell administrative office and is the vice-president
president of Twizere Agriculture
Club’s parent committee
committee. She is also friends with many of the teachers at Gitarama Primary School.
School

↓

 Beneficiary is a close
friend with the local
leader B.
 Beneficiary is a friend
with local leader B. She
is a housekeeper for one
of local leader B’s two
houses when she is not
there. She lives next to
local leader B.

→

Influential Positions ADULT
Project Beneficiaries
Interviewed Have in the
Gitarama Community

Relationships ADULT
Project Beneficiaries
Interviewed Have With
Teachers at Gitarama
Primary School

Other Special
Circumstances That
Show Influence in the
Community of Gitarama or
That the Child Beneficiary
Has Extra Resources of
Help Outside the Twizere
Agriculture Club Project

↑


Guardian of one child project beneficiary shows evidence of wealth. She is aggressive in nature and many
people seem to fear and respect her. She lives near Gitarama Primary School.



One child project beneficiary is an orphan and lives with her older sister (who is >18 yrs.) and her sister's
husband, who are her guardians
guardians. Her brother-in-law is in charge of security in Gitarama Cell. The child is in
another project called COMPASSION
COMPASSION, where the children in that project receive many material goods, such
as cooking pots, jerry cans, and school supplies. The family ow
owns
ns many cows and their own fields where
they cultivate.



One child beneficiary left the project almost immediately after being chosen. He said he did not have time
because he had to care for his father's cows
cows, which he raises to sell. His father also boardss other people’s
cows, farms, and builds houses. His family appears to be influential in the Gitarama community.
Note:: This child did not participate in the constraints interview since he left the project and therefore, was
not counted
ounted among the child pr
project beneficiaries in the research.. However, this example further shows the
poor identification conducted by Gitarama Primary School personnel (school leaders and teachers).
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Figure 20
Gender Proportions in the
Twizere Agriculture Club Project

Women in the
Twizere Agriculture
Club Project who
are widows or
whose husbands are
absent from the
home
(8/14) 57%

Men in the Twizere
Agriculture Club
Project
(2/14) 14%

Women in the
Twizere Agriculture
Club Project whose
husbands are
present in the home
(4/14) 29%

Women in the
Twizere Agriculture
Club Project
(12/14) 86%
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Appendix G: Photos of the Twizere Agriculture Club Project

Kibuye Town
(Bwishyura
Sector, Karongi
District, West
Province)
Road to Kigali

Route to Kigali

Gitarama
Primary School
(Gitarama Cell,
Bwishyura Sector,
Karongi District,
West Province)

Source:: Google Maps © 2012 www.maps.google.com

Gitarama
Primary School

Source:: Google Maps © 2012 www.maps.google.com
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Gitarama
Primary School

House of a project
beneficiary

Source: Google Maps © 2012 www.maps.google.com

GPS’s Toilets

The teachers’ lounge,
headmistress’s office, and
6th grade classroom

House of project beneficiary
House of Gitarama resident
(not a project beneficiary)

Source: Google Maps © 2012 www.maps.google.com

Gitarama Primary School’s classrooms
Twizere Agriculture Club’s
chicken coop and rabbit hutch
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Above: View of Lake Kivu from Gitarama.

Above: Partial view of Gitarama looking
towards Kibuye town and Lake Kivu.

Photographer: Bryna C. Ramsey (2010)

Above three photos: On the way to Gitarama—Hills of Bwishyura Sector.
Photographer: Bryna C. Ramsey (2010)

Above: Gitarama children—
near Gitarama Primary School.

Above: Gitarama children pointing the
way to Gitarama Primary School.
Photographer: Bryna C. Ramsey (2010)
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Top left: A hillside water pipe near
Gitarama Primary School—built
School
by the
Government of Rwanda.
eservoir in Gitarama—near
Gitarama
Top right: A reservoir
Gitarama Primary School—built
School
by the
Government of Rwanda.
le left: Gitarama Primary School
Middle
(Buildings on the far left and far right are
classrooms. House in the middle is a
civilian’s home).
Bottom left: Children playing at Gitarama
Primary School.
Bottom right: Teacher’s lounge and
outdoor makeshift classroom for
kindergarten students at Gitarama Primary
School. The foundation poles of this
classroom later were used to build the
rabbit hutch.
Photographer: Bryna C. Ramsey (2010)
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Top left: Schoolchildren at Gitarama Primary School.
Top right: Introducing the project to school personnel
and parents of Gitarama Primary School students at a
meeting.
Bottom left: Parents of Gitarama Primary School
students at the meeting about the Twizere Agriculture
Club Project.
Second right: At meeting with school personnel and
parents of Gitarama Primary School students.
Third right: Building a road to Gitarama Primary
School during an umuganda in Gitarama Cell.
Bottom right: Conducting the first meeting of
Twizere Agriculture Club with project beneficiaries.

Photographer: Bryna C. Ramsey (2010)
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Top left: With project beneficiaries at the first
meeting of Twizere Agriculture Club.
Top right: Adult project beneficiaries at a meeting
for parent committee elections.
Middle left: With child project beneficiaries at a
club meeting.
Middle right and bottom right: Child project
beneficiaries carrying materials for the chicken
coop construction from Kibuye town to Gitarama
Primary School.
Photographer: Bryna C. Ramsey (2010)
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All photos on this page: Construction of Twizere Agriculture Club’s chicken coop by project beneficiaries and
members of Peace Health Club at Ruganda Secondary School in Kibuye.
Photographer: Bryna C. Ramsey (2010)
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Top and middle left: Recording the purchase of club
rabbits.
Top right: A project beneficiary and teacher from Peace
Health Club (Ruganda Secondary School, Kibuye)
inspect a rabbit for purchase.
Bottom left: Children at Gitarama Primary School and
Bryna Ramsey holding one of the club’s rabbits.
Middle left: Two club rabbits after purchase.
Bottom right: One of Twizere Agriculture Club’s first
litters of bunnies.
Photographer: Bryna C. Ramsey (2010 and 2011)
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Top left: The rabbit hutch partially built.
Top right: The wide-holed screen on the bottom of the rabbit hutch.
Second left: The unsealed inside of the rabbit hutch.
Second right: Rabbit hutch roof from old tin from school grounds.
Third right: The completed rabbit hutch.
Third left: The completed chicken coop.
Bottom left: The back of the completed chicken coop.
Bottom right: The completed chicken coop and rabbit hutch.
Photographer: Bryna C. Ramsey (2010)
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Top left: A beneficiary checking on the club chickens.
Top right: Child beneficiaries observing club chickens and rabbits soon after purchase.
Middle left: Talking to child beneficiaries regarding the purchasing of club rabbits.
Middle right: Club chickens in the new chicken coop after purchase.
Bottom left and right: Holding a meeting with adult project beneficiaries at a beneficiary’s home.
Photographer: Bryna C. Ramsey (2010 and 2011)
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Top left: The destroyed benches of the rabbit hutch.
Top middle: Moldy floorboards of the rabbit hutch rooms from neglect.
Top right: The weak screen on the bottom of the rabbit hutch broken.
Middle left: The broken lock of the chicken coop door.
Middle: Broken board and unsanitary conditions of the chicken coop from neglect
Middle right: A bunny born without ears
ears, possibly due to poor nutrition of its mother.
Bottom left and middle: Club rabbits with skin infections from poor nutrition and lack of sanitation.
Bottom right: A healthy project chicken (chicken on the right) sitting on eggs at a beneficiary’s home after being
taken home from Gitarama Primary School by the project beneficiarie
beneficiaries.
Photographer: Bryna C. Ramsey (2011)
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Top left: On the way to conduct the constraints and wealth index interviews.
Top right: Gitarama locals from Group 2 project beneficiaries.
Second left: Interviewing an adult beneficiary.
Second right: Interviewing a child beneficiary.
Third left: Interviewing a child beneficiary.
Third right: An adult beneficiary with her two children during the constraints
interview.
Left: Interviewing a Gitarama local during the wealth index interview.
Photographer: Bryna C. Ramsey (2011)
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